The Thesis Committee for Teresa Elizabeth Mioli
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

Practicing Investigative Journalism during Peru's Internal War, 1980-2000

APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Supervisor:

Henry Dietz

Rosental Alves

Practicing Investigative Journalism during Peru's Internal War, 1980-2000

by

Teresa Elizabeth Mioli, BJ, BA

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2015

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my father who has unconditionally supported and loved me always. He is the reason I have been able to pursue my dreams.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank my advisers, Henry Dietz and Rosental Alves, who have been mentors to me in my undergraduate and graduate careers at The University. Their inspiration and patience has taken me to this point. I want to thank Ursula Freundt-Thurne who was never too busy to offer advice or send an email on my behalf. Thank you to Gustavo Gorriti, Ángel Páez, Ricardo Uceda, Edmundo Cruz, María Mendoza Michilot, Orazio Potesta, Marco Mendez Campos and Juan Paredes Castro for taking time to explain their journalistic processes and the history of their beautiful country.

Thank you to my colleagues Mario Mercado Diaz, Bridget Footit, Sara Law, Paola Nalvarte and Nino Bariola for helping with the writing and editing process. To all my colleagues and professors at LLILAS, thank you for being encouraging, challenging and critical. I am immensely grateful and honored to have spent the last two years in your company. I thank my family for pushing and encouraging me in all of my pursuits, but especially in my education these last two years.

And finally, I thank Perú for providing me a place to learn and explore. I hope I have contributed in some small way to preserving your history and truth.

> "It takes stubbornness, perhaps arrogance, and a certain faith in the face of long odds to write about someone else's country."
> Robin Kirk, *The Monkey's Paw* (1997)

Abstract

Practicing Investigative Journalism during Peru's Internal War, 1980-2000

Teresa Elizabeth Mioli, MA

The University of Texas at Austin, 2015

Supervisor: Henry Dietz

Investigative journalists serve as important checks on power and abuse that threaten democratic systems. At the same time, they rely on government to provide and enforce democratic rights that allow for freedom of expression, access to information and protection from violence. Looking at the case of Peru during the internal war from 1980 to 2000, we see how independent journalists were able to uncover corruption and political violence despite increasingly authoritarian political environments which sought to restrict the flow of information. The focus of this paper are the methods by which investigative journalists are able to resist authoritarian pressures to perform the functions of watchdogs for democracy.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

CHAPTER 1: Argument

> Democracies still need the press and particularly require an unlovable press. They need journalists who get in the face of power – and are enabled to do so because both their doggedness and their irreverence is protected by law, by a conducive political culture, and by a historical record of having served self-government well when they hunt down elusive or hidden facts.
> (Schudson, 2008, p. 10)

What happens to the role of independent news media when a democratic state becomes increasingly autocratic while still maintaining the bare minimum of procedural requirements for a democracy? Can a press that is a watchdog of the government survive? We see in the case of Peru and the increasingly violent and authoritarian political environment during a period of internal war (1980-2000[1]), independent investigative journalists were able to uncover corruption and abuses of power. However, this only happened because of a combination of factors: an outcry from independent media, protest from international governments to respect freedom of the press, and the government's efforts to maintain a semblance of democracy and freedom of the press. How journalists were able to resist authoritarian pressures and practice investigative journalism is the focus of this paper.

"Investigative journalism is distinctive in that it publicizes information about wrongdoing affecting the public interest" (Waisbord, 2002, p. 377). By this definition, investigative journalism becomes the means by which civilians fight for a return to full democracy by uncovering abuses that violate basic human and political rights. Investigative journalists serve as important checks on power and abuse that threaten democratic systems. At the same time, they rely on governments to provide and enforce

[1] For purposes of this thesis, I am using the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's time range for the internal war, which is 1980 to 2000.

democratic rights that allow for freedom of expression, access to information and protection from violence.

In this paper, I examine how investigative journalism in Lima-based print news media operated under the weak democratic governments of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) and Alan García (1985-1990) and the autocratic government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). I also examine how the insurgent actions of subversive group Sendero Luminoso (SL) altered the practice of investigative reporting. I look at investigative coverage of two of the biggest threats to Peruvians' democratic rights during these years: political violence and government corruption. Jo-Marie Burt (2007) characterizes both the SL guerrilla movement and Alberto Fujimori's administration as "authoritarian political projects" that "visited violence upon civil society actors in ways that contributed to the severe erosion of community, solidarity, social trust, and communication, and thus the ability of such actors to organize to contest power" (p. 3)[2]. SL and state security forces, especially under Fujimori, used violence to silence civil society and opposition (Burt, 2007, 13).

In terms of the democratic functions of investigative journalism, most attention on Latin American cases has focused on the press' exposure of government wrongdoing. Waisbord (2000) notes that Latin American reports frequently focused on both government corruption and human rights abuses. Certainly, investigative reports of government corruption published during the regimes of Belaúnde, García and Fujimori uncovered abuses and consequently increased accountability of government officials. However, I also address an issue largely ignored in analysis of investigative journalism during this period: human rights violations committed by SL. The focus of investigative journalists on

[2] To clarify, Peruvians lived under a democracy from 1980 to April 4, 1992. From the night of the autogolpe on April 5, 1992 to 2000, Peruvians lived under electoral authoritarianism of Fujimori, as will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.

political violence carried out by SL and MRTA during *la guerra interna* called public attention to a threat that was largely ignored because of government and security officials' misjudgment or underestimation of the situation and the fact that the worst cases of violence occurred in rural areas and received little treatment (initially) in the Lima press (Gorriti, 1999). As Waisbord (2002) says, "By bringing out information that is not publicly available, IJ contributes to the nurturing of an informed citizen which has been often considered a primary condition of democratic life" (p. 381). While Waisbord (2000, 2002) mostly addresses investigative reporting that uncovers corruption or human rights abuses at the hands of government or business, it can be argued that by uncovering the seriousness of SL and the political violence and human rights abuses it was waging in the countryside, investigative journalists helped to expose one of the biggest threats to Peruvian democracy.

JOURNALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm (1963) outline four theories of the press in their classic 1956 book that serves as the basis for much of what we know about the operation and motivations of mass media. The authoritarian and social responsibility theories are most pertinent for this study. Whereas the chief purpose of the media in an authoritarian setting is to support the government and the state, the media are meant to "inform, entertain, sell – but chiefly to raise conflict to the plane of discussion" (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1963, p. 7). In line with the social responsibility theory, liberal press theory views media as the fourth estate of democracy. Media work alongside the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government to as a check on power. The democratic function of journalism stems from this accountability power.[3]

[3]In his article "Democracy, Journalism, and Latin American Populism", Silvio Waisbord (2013) challenges traditional arguments about the relationship between journalism and democracy by examining the case of Latin American populism. He argues that both journalism and democracy are complex and contested ideas (504). Populism changes the role of media by placing "the state at the center of media systems" and

In his work *Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press,* Michael Schudson (2008) outlines six functions of the press in a representative democracy. The functions most relevant to this discussion are the roles of investigation, analysis, and social empathy[4]. Regarding the investigative function, Schudson (2008) says that the ideal of protecting democracy through investigation "assumes that the world is relatively complex and veiled, and that some of the information that is most important to citizens is embedded in opaque structures and systems and may in fact be deliberately hidden from view" (p. 15). With its power of analysis, journalism provides context and makes sense of events. The role of empathy is two-fold: it shows empathy of the journalist and "encourage[s] empathy and understanding in the audience" (Schudson, 2008, p. 19). Investigative journalists working during the internal war not only worked to reveal wrongdoing, but also to explain the complexities of the wrongdoing and placed them in context. Their coverage of the victim of the internal war inspired empathy in elite readers who had the power to call for change.

We need to understand this idea of the liberal press in the context of Peruvian and Latin American journalism. Waisbord (2000) explains that economic and political relations between the state and media companies, partisan culture, political instability, and the absence of democracy traditionally prohibited the fourth estate model and therefore investigative reporting from taking hold in the region (p. xxi-xxii). Waisbord (2000) studies how the model of investigative reporting changed when imported to the Latin

approaching "market and civil society as opposed or subjected to the designs of the government" (504). Waisbord argues that, in contrast, the liberal press model assigns a central role to the market and relegates participation of civil society and the state to periphery roles. The case of populism argues that we have to consider the relationships between the state, market, and civil society if we are going to understand the relationship between journalism and democracy (504). We have to acknowledge multiple models of media democracy that change based on relationships between state, market, and civil society (505). Consequently, Waisbord posits that there is no absolute relationship between democracy and journalism; one does not necessarily lead to the other. That being said, there is still room for journalism to help in maintaining democratic institutions, but this depends on the network of state, market, and civil society.

[4] For a more in-depth discussion of the role of journalism in representative democracies, see Schudson's book. He goes into great detail on how each of the six functions operate to preserve democracy.

American context. According to Waisbord (2000), one of the main differences between Anglo-American and Latin American practices of investigative journalism is the question of objectivity. Waisbord (2000) wrote, "…the increasing concern with facticity in South American journalism does not imply unanimity about the desirability of objectivity" (p. xxiii). This point is contested by some Latin American journalists who argue that objectivity is a goal for them just as it is for journalists who practice in the United States. Journalists in both regions may struggle with what it means to be objective. Others recognize the limitations of objectivity and the inability to be truly unbiased or free of influence. As is explored briefly later, there are many interpretations of "objectivity," with some journalists sacrificing a dogged pursuit of the truth with mere satisfaction in getting the points of view of both sides of the story. During the internal war, journalists practiced under both interpretations; the investigative journalists I examine adhered to objectivity through a pursuit of the truth and a critical attitude toward all sources.

WHAT IS INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM?

Academics generally equate investigative journalism with the fourth estate model of journalism due to its ability to hold government accountable (Waisbord, 2002, p. 377). As explained earlier, investigative journalism publishes information about wrongdoing (Waisbord, 2002, p. 377). Waisbord (2000) points to dissent among journalists when it comes to defining investigative journalism based on methods, such as active reporting or reliance on leaks, or outcomes, such as effects on public opinion or public policy (p. xv-

xvii). In the end, Waisbord (2000) defines investigative journalism[5] as reporting that uncovers power abuses (p. xix).

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter Two provides context for Peruvian media and the political environments of the 1980s and 1990s. I discuss the traditional role of media in Peruvian history, as well as readership, distribution and the specific functions of different media types. Particular attention is given to the important issues covered by investigative reports during the internal war. The political environments of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, Alan García, and Alberto Fujimori, including their actions concerning the press, are covered. I also briefly discuss the ideology behind SL's military war. I provide background on the role and use of political violence by both the Fujimori government and SL, as well as abuse of power by the former, in order to lay out the context in which investigative journalists practiced during this period.

Chapter Three presents a discussion of how investigative journalists practiced in Peru during the internal war. To introduce the chapter, I discuss the emergence of investigative journalism in Peru and the Lima-based publications that produced investigative reports. I identify the particular issues that most influenced investigative journalism at this time, including the provision of context, procurement of sources, determination of credibility and editorial independence. I also concentrate on how journalists navigated reporting challenges related to political violence.

Chapter Four provides an intensive review of particular cases of investigative work by Lima-based publications *Caretas* and *Sí.* I examine investigative reports written by

[5] In his 2000 work, Waisbord uses the term "watchdog journalism" because "standard definitions of 'investigative journalism' reflect experiences and practices in the United States'" (p. xix).

Caretas reporter Gustavo Gorriti covering the early years of SL's military offensive against the state. Gorriti uncovered the group's ideology through interviews with members and close associates. He combed through SL's manifestos and relayed the organization's specific words and plans while provide context for the reader so that the public might understand the threat posed by the group. Reporters Edmundo Cruz and Jose Arrieta, along with help from editor Ricardo Uceda, uncovered the presence of a secret military death squad working on behalf of the government. They used police records, eyewitness testimony, anonymous tips, and maps to find the actors behind two of the most notorious killings from the internal war. Through analysis of the final product, we see how the practices discussed in Chapter 3 were applied to uncover wrongdoing, even in the midst of pressure from SL and the Fujimori government.

In Chapter 5, I reflect on lessons learned from the journalists who practiced during the internal war. Based on these lessons, I offer suggestions for how reporters in environments mired by political violence and restrictions on the press from an authoritarian government might produce effective and meaningful investigative journalism. I also consider the lasting effects of the investigative journalism produced during this period, the initiatives later pursued by some of the journalists, and ethical dilemmas now faced in the wake of these decades. Finally, I offer suggestions for future research on investigative journalism and democracy.

CHAPTER 2: Context

The TRC has established that the internal armed conflict experienced by Peru between 1980 and 2000 constituted the most intense, extensive and prolonged episode of violence in the entire history of the Republic. It was also a conflict that revealed deep and painful divides and misunderstandings in Peruvian society.
(Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003e)

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

To understand the importance of investigative journalism to Peruvian society during the time under discussion, it is important to understand the depth and breadth of the internal conflict as well as the motivations behind the various actors who played a role. Internal conflict between guerrilla and state security forces ravaged Peru from 1980 to 2000. Peruvians use the terms *el terrorismo, la violencía,* or *la guerra interna* to refer to this time period. La Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), which the government established post-conflict, estimated that about 70,000 Peruvians died during this time period[6] (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación [CVR], 2003e). Sendero Luminoso (SL), the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist organization headed by Abimael Guzmán, was responsible for about 54 percent of deaths and disappearances, while the CVR attributes about 37 percent to the state security forces (CVR, 2003e). The CVR (2003e) attributes just 1.5 percent to the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA). It has not attributed the remaining percentage of deaths and disappearances to any group or individual. I do not discuss or analyze the actions of the MRTA in this paper due to space constraints and the fact that their reach or impact on Peruvian society was much less than that of SL.

[6] Some estimates place the number of deaths at a higher number, but this is the official government record.

The Global Terrorism Database compiled statistical information on "terrorist events" attributed to SL and MRTA during the 20-year-period. A search of the GDT[7] attributed 561 terrorist events to the MRTA from 1980 to 2000, with the greatest number of incidents (about 120) occurring in 1986. According to the database, SL was the perpetrator of 3,949 terrorist events during the same time period. The height of activity took place in 1989 with almost 500 incidents occurring in that year. By far, the greatest percentage of people killed and disappeared in the conflict spoke Quechua as their native language and worked as farmers (CVR, 2003e). Ayacucho overwhelmingly was the department most affected by the internal conflict, followed by the Central regions of Junín and Pasco[8].

Belaúnde and García's Weak Democracies: 1980 - 1989[9]

Fernando Belaúnde Terry took office in July 1980 as Perú returned to democracy after twelve years of military rule[10]. Peruvian society entered the new decade with high

[7] GDT is a project of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. When searching the GDT, I selected that the following criteria be met (Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal. Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, ie. the act must be outside the perimeters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or noncombatants). I entered the following criteria: when (1980 to 2000), region (South America), country (Peru), perpetrator (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement), weapon type (all listed, see website for extensive list), attack type (all listed, see website for extensive list), target type (all listed, see website for extensive list). I also opted to include ambiguous cases and did not limit the search to include only a certain range of casualties. For Shining Path incidents, I performed the same search, but selected Shining Path as the perpetrator.

[8] See Appendix 2 for a detailed map of deaths and disappearances by region.

[9] I refer to Perú under Belaúnde and García as a weak democracy because both administrations met the procedural minimum requirements for democracy and regularly held elections, but they also faced measurable challenges to national security and their monopolies on use of physical force. SL's challenge of state power was so strong that the administrations were forced to declare "states of emergency" and suspend some citizens' rights in certain areas of the country during this time.

[10] General Juan Velasco led a military-coup against Belaúnde in 1968. General Francisco Morales Bermúdez deposed Velasco in 1975. The country returned to democracy in 1980 with the re-election of Belaúnde.

hopes for how democracy might transform the country for the better (Gorriti, 1999, p. 15-16). However, SL took advantage of this transitional moment to launch its military war and undermine the power of the state. Abimael Guzmán, a professor at the University of Huamanga in the Ayacucho region in the southern highlands of Peru, founded SL; he recruited adherents among college students and persuaded them over to his own extreme communist ideology and to the cause of revolution. SL launched their military war against Belaúnde's newly established democratic government in 1980 by burning ballot boxes in the rural town of Chuschi, an event that went largely unnoticed by the media, politicians and limeño society at large. The insurgent group aimed to rally its followers in a violent overthrow of the democratic government, which they would replace with a regime guided by Marxist-Maoist-Leninist thought. The group had been organizing and developing its particular ideology for at least two decades, and in 1980, launched the beginning of armed actions against the state. The absence of the state in the rural areas created a vacuum around which SL rallied the marginalized indigenous peasants living in rural Perú. Where and when indoctrination did not work, the group turned to violent coercion.

Gorriti (1999) shows that for Guzmán, the "objective conditions" for revolution were present (p. 58). Guzmán saw the 1980s as critical period because of the transition to democratic rule. It proved to be an incredibly effective decision as the Peruvian state's inability to govern and maintain control of the provinces became clear as the decade progressed. Gorriti (1999) quotes Guzmán: "'What is crucial is that the suffering of those from below from exploitation be tied to the inability of those from above to govern…'" (p. 58). Guzmán did this by linking the injustices suffered by Peruvians in the countryside to government policies of previous years, mostly in relation to land reform. This is the initial method SL used to gain adherents.

Political violence was central to SL's version of Marxist-Maoist-Leninist ideology. It was also a central tool for waging military war. Guzmán explained to *El Diario* in July 1988, "If one is persistent, maintains politics in command, maintains the political strategy, maintains the military strategy, if one has a clear, defined plan, then one advances and is able to meet any bloodbath…we began planning for the bloodbath in 1980 because we knew it had to come" (as cited in Gorriti, 1999, p. 98). To transition from protest to military war, Guzmán employed various methods of "overflow" relating to different parts of the country (Gorriti, 1999, p. 60). Gorriti explained that for the cities, this included violent rallies, "spontaneous" looting, sabotage, and propaganda. For the countryside, SL employed raids known as the "gathering of harvests" on ranches or agricultural communities (Gorriti, 1999). This involved looting or destruction of machines and crops, as well as physical attacks against landowners or their representatives.

For the first few years after the launch of SL's war, the government and security forces underestimated the threat posed by the organization. Some intelligence agents and government officials even placed the blame on international groups (Gorriti, 1999, Chapter 5). Increasing political violence ultimately demanded the attention of the federal government. Belaúnde declared an initial state of emergency in Ayacucho in 1981. The following year, international organizations like Amnesty International started to express concern about human rights abuses in the country (CVR, 2003c, p. 58). When efforts by the police force to contain SL failed, the Peruvian government launched a military counterinsurgency in the rural provinces in December 1982 that resulted in intense and uncontrolled violence.[11]

[11] For a detailed account of the government's counterinsurgency efforts against SL from 1980 to 1983, see Gorriti's *The Shining Path.*

Peruvians elected Alan García of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) to the presidency in mid-decade and he took office in 1985 faced with an increasingly violent situation between SL and the security forces, with civilians caught in the middle. Upon taking office, García said his administration's counter-subversion strategy would change and would emphasize respect for human rights (CVR, 2003f, p. 737). However, violence continued, and, in 1986, the government declared that Lima was in a state of emergency. Jo-Marie Burt (2007) argues the following year, Garcia's counterinsurgency policy "reverted to the hard-line approach predominant in 1983 and 1984" and that "human rights abuses increased sharply" (p. 63).

SL was not the only major challenge for the democratic governments of Belaúnde and García during the 1980s. Peru also experienced an economic crisis and hyperinflation. Belaúnde's government introduced a neoliberal reform program starting in 1980. The country eventually experienced a debt crisis from 1983 to 1985, during which the Belaúnde administration borrowed from foreign banks and lending agencies and spent most of Peru's export income to alleviate the debt (Mauceri, 1996, p. 48). The economy entered a recession. The average inflation rate during Belaúnde's presidency was 97.3 percent and the GDP growth rate was 0.7 percent (Tanaka, 2005, p. 265).

Peruvians elected García, who ran on a populist platform, in part as a response to the Belaúnde government's failed neoliberal policies (Mauceri, 1996, p. 59). Despite initial economic success, the administration's increased state spending and the absence of parallel private investment led to more economic problems (Mauceri, 1996, p. 64). Average inflation under García was 1,662.5 percent and the GDP growth rate was 2.0 percent (Tanaka, 2005, p. 65). At the end of the 1980s, the inflation rate reached 7,481.7%, and in 1990, the GDP fell 12.9 percentage points (Tanaka, 2005, p. 65). Additionally, the populist administration did not have support of mass organizations and was also plagued

by a corrupt and politicized elite (Tanaka, 2005, p. 63). García himself would become the subject of investigative reports that revealed corruption in his government[12].

Electoral Authoritarianism under Alberto Fujimori: 1992-2000

Like much of Latin America, Perú entered the 1990s having endured severe economic decay, as noted above. Many Peruvians saw neopopulist leader and *outsider*[13] Alberto Fujimori as the answer and elected him president. To supporters of Fujimori, he was a savior who delivered the country from terrorism and a bad economy. To his detractors, he was an authoritarian who greatly expanded the power of the executive branch while violating human rights and destroying a fledgling democracy. According to Tanaka (2005), Fujimori was able to succeed because of mistakes made by main political actors and his ability to stop hyperinflation (p. 263)[14]. In his fight to rein in political violence, Fujimori allowed state security forces to use violence against not only alleged subversives, but also journalists and other activists critical of his regime. Under the leadership of Fujimori and close adviser and de facto intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, the security forces effectively waged a campaign of violence in which scores of innocent Peruvians were killed.

Two years into Fujimori's presidency, he and Montesinos would replace SL as the greatest threats to Peruvian democracy. On April 5, 1992, Fujimori, with the help of the military, dissolved Congress and much of the judiciary, suspended the Constitution, and

[12] For more information on investigative reports concerning García's government and business misdeeds, see pages 49 – 50 in *Watchdog Journalism.*

[13] Fujimori was not a member of the political establishment. As the son of Japanese immigrants, he was an ethnic minority who many indigenous citizens related to.

[14] In Tanaka's interpretation of the case, the political violence of the internal conflict did not significantly impact the political system because it took place largely in isolated rural areas. He challenges conventional wisdom that says a historical absence of democratic institutions and structural constraints meant the country was unlikely to consolidate democracy. For Tanaka, the key to Fujimori's success was his anti-establishment position and mistakes committed by main political actors. He also contends that Fujimori's administration was a dictatorship only between April and November 1992 (261-266).

executed what most observers called an autogolpe or self-coup. Steven Levitsky (1999) argues that a majority of Peruvians supported the coup not only as a means to address hyperinflation and terrorism, but also as a rejection of the "oligarchic" political class that "had ceased to adequately represent most Peruvians" (p. 81). Fujimori enjoyed an average approval rating of 70% in 1992 (See Appendix 3). After the autogolpe, Fujimori continued to use increased executive powers, restrictive legislation, and the apparatus of the SIN (the secret police) to limit the constitutional freedoms of Peruvians. Press freedom became one of his main targets.

In September 1992, an elite police unit captured Abimael Guzmán, the leader of the Shining Path, thereby collapsing its ability to wage political violence. At the same time Fujimori and a team of technocrats had improved the economic situation of the country by instituting neoliberal reforms that reduced inflation and foreign debt. However, these reforms failed to reach the lower classes who still suffered from a lower quality of life. To compensate and keep the support of the population that elected him to office, he instituted a number of social welfare programs targeted at them. (Mauceri, 1997, p. 902). Three years later, the nation re-elected Fujimori by an extraordinarily wide margin. However, he would start to lose support after this election because of attempts to "consolidate control over the country's judicial and electoral authorities, his decision to run for an unconstitutional third term, and particularly, Peru's recession" (Schmidt, 2000, p. 9). After "winning" his third election,[15] Fujimori resigned from the presidency after a Lima television station aired a video showing his administration's abuses of power. Journalists revealed that Montesinos had bribed a congressman from the opposition. Later footage revealed that Montesinos

[15] On February 29, 2000, *El Comercio* "published a five-page report on the falsification of 1.2 million signatures for the inscription of Perú 2000 as a competing party in the 2000 elections" (McClintock, 2006, p. 258). Fujimori was running under that banner. There was significant national and international attention surrounding the possibility of voter fraud in this election. Protest continued after Fujimori was inaugurated for the third time.

also bribed some members of mainstream television and newspaper media in exchange for positive coverage of the regime. Additionally, the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) would find that state security and intelligence forces threatened journalists against producing investigative reports about government abuses. For the next decade, journalists would publish stories unveiling the extent of corruption inside the regime.

Academics have struggled to define Fujimori's regime after the 1992 autogolpe. A Constitutional Assembly convened after the coup to produce a new constitution, some democratic institutions resumed operation, and presidential elections were held in 1995. But, Fujimori's abuses of democratic freedoms have been widely documented. The 1993 Constitution increased the powers of the executive. Further, Mauceri (1997) discussed how Fujimori used technocrats and informal networks of loyalists, including friends and family, "to increase the autonomy of the state and reduce democratic accountability" (p. 900). These two groups, along with the fact that no real political party was created by Fujimori during this time (see "disposable parties," Levitsky (2007)), provided a dangerous combination to democracy as it limited the incorporation of a plurality of voices in the decision- making process. During his tenure, Fujimori also passed sweeping anti-terrorism legislation and turned over suspected "terrorists" to military tribunals with anonymous judges.

So, how do you categorize a regime that is democratic on paper, but authoritarian in practice? In his analysis of the Fujimori regime, Mauceri (1997) argues that the executive's centralization of power and the creation of personalist networks decreased the extent to which elections and the separation of powers worked to hold officials accountable (p. 909). He called the Fujimori regime "semiauthoritarian" and an "autocratic democracy" (Mauceri, 1997). Levitsky (1999) concluded that under Fujimori, Peru fell short of the minimum procedural standards for democracy and was "at best a semidemocracy" (p. 80).

Other terms he uses are "democratic dictatorship" and "nondemocracy". Among the deficiencies of the administration, Levitsky (1999) cites the power of the armed forces and the SIN that were not subordinate to civilians, intimidation of the press and opposition, and "politicization of electoral institutions" (p. 80). He concedes that although Fujimori did not build lasting democratic institutions during his regime, he also did not build strong authoritarian institutions (Levitsky, 1999, p. 84). Kruijt (2001), like others, posits that Fujimori governed under "dictatorial neo-populism in which, with the support of the armed forces, the civilian presidents govern under the formal vigilance of degraded parliaments" (p. 416). Despite the varying terms used to describe the regime, there appears to be consensus that while Fujimori's government restored some democratic institutions and held open elections in 1995, the regime was authoritarian in how it exercised its power and subverted democratic rights. In the 2006 work *The Fujimori Legacy*, a collection of social scientists reflected on Fujimori's administration and many settled on defining it as an example of electoral authoritarianism. Schedler said electoral authoritarianism pertains to regimes "that hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and interparty competition, but at the same time violate minimal democratic norms so severely and systematically that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, however qualified" (as cited in Carrión, 2006, p. 299). For purposes of this paper, I consider Fujimori's administration as part of this group.

Yet, it is important to note that Fujimori enjoyed high approval ratings during his presidency. Even as Fujimori has been convicted for crimes committed while he was president, Peruvians are divided on whether his actions were necessary for the good of the country. It is a complicated situation that cannot be understood in black and white terms, though most discussion on the topic paints the situation this way. It is important to keep in mind the threats to democracy posed by SL and the government, but to also understand

how many Peruvians weigh the value of democracy against the assurance of basic protections and provisions.

PERUVIAN MEDIA

This paper focuses on some of the main Lima-based publications produced during the internal war. *El Comercio* is considered the newspaper of record in Peru. *La República* often vies for second place in readership. Readers of weekly magazines like *Caretas*, *Oiga* and *Sí* were members of the urban middle- and upper-middle class. Gorriti argues that the publications' normally high degree of influence on readers ebbed after the 1992 autogolpe since most of the audience supported Fujimori's actions and were therefore at odds with the magazines which remained some of the only critical and opposing outlets. "They continued to buy the magazines, as their desire for fresh information – and their wariness of disinformation – was stronger than their disagreements, but the editorial influence of the magazines began to dwindle" (Gorriti, 1993, p. 239).

Regarding SL, Gorriti (1993) has written that "For journalists, analysts and historians, *El Diario* became one of the few reliable and relatively accessible sources for an otherwise mysterious organization" (p. 232). *El Diario* can be traced back to the publication *El Diario de Marka*, which was itself a product of the weekly magazine *Marka*. *El Diario de Marka* started to circulate in 1980 with a socialist discourse (Mendoza, 2013, p. 187). Initially, it was a publication of the legal left, but it eventually was taken over by SL and became known as *El Diario*. Gorriti (1993) argues that the Belaúnde government's commitment to freedom of expression had the effect of allowing the publication and distribution of *El Diario* as the mouthpiece for the Shining Path for much of the 1980s (p. 231). *El Diario* was eventually shut down, but it resumed production clandestinely in 1992.

MEDIA UNDER BELAÚNDE, GARCÍA, AND FUJIMORI

The beginning of Belaúnde's presidency in 1980 marked not only a return to democracy after twelve years of military dictatorship, but also the return of numerous newspapers to their original owners. In an effort to "peruvianize the press[16]," General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the leader of the military government (1968-1980), confiscated various newspapers on July 27, 1974 and handed them over to new ownership (Mendoza, 2013, p. 147-148). *El Comercio, Ojo,* and *Expreso* were among the papers that received new directors on July 28. The regime said it was an action of the revolution to make "structural changes" by giving the newspapers to different social sectors like the peasant or industrial sectors, but bureaucrats appointed by the government were the true directors (Gorriti, 1993, p. 226-228). The new directors toed the regime's line or were replaced. Velasco had closed *Caretas* the previous month. Television and radio stations were later seized. Publishers, editors, and journalists whose newspaper were expropriated spent the rest of the decade in exile and some had their citizenship revoked (Gorriti, 1993, p. 226). Shortly after Belaúnde took office in July 1980, he restored the newspapers, as well as the television and radio stations, to their owners. New publications were created and media outlets embraced technological innovations (Mendoza, 2013, 123, 170). In comparison with the previous decade, journalists enjoyed much greater press freedoms; yet, two years into Fujimori's presidency, they would again be under attack.

In line with his efforts to preserve a semblance of democracy (partly to avoid international pressure), Fujimori maintained that journalists enjoyed press freedom throughout his presidency. Catherine Conaghan (2005) contends that "press freedom was a significant marker for how the regime was regarded abroad" (p. 140-141). Consequently, the Fujimori administration gave to the United States government and press advocacy

[16] "peruanizar la prensa"

organizations verbal commitments and arguments regarding the status of a free press in Peru. Gorriti (1993) argues that opposition to the coup from weekly magazines *Caretas*, *Oiga*, and *Sí* was tolerated publicly by the administration because of international pressure for freedom of the press, the magazine's limited circulation, and because their presence meant the government could claim press freedom was being protected (p. 239). However, as Gorriti (1993) points out "The existence of one or few dissenting publications…does not guarantee that democracy exists" (p. 240). Meanwhile, to serve his goal of centralizing authority in the executive and limiting dissent, Fujimori subverted freedom of the press through restrictive legislation and manipulation of the judicial system, bribery and misuse of state money, and the state military and intelligence organizations. As a result, he effectively limited one of the main components of democracy (Mioli, 2008)[17].

The practice of investigative journalism became noticeably more difficult starting on the night of the April 5, 1992 autogolpe by Fujimori. On the following morning, Fujimori sent government troops to occupy newspaper, newsmagazine, television and radio stations. Government officials called in news outlet managers and owners or paid visits to their offices to explain that the government respected press freedom, but that the coup was necessary to save the country (Rospigliosi, 2000, p. 81; *El Comercio 1992*). On the night of the coup, armed men kidnapped *Caretas* journalist Gustavo Gorriti from his home; he was released only due to a contingency plan he and his wife had put in place. His investigative reports on Montesinos, which he started writing in the 1980s long before Montesinos was de facto intelligence chief and closest adviser to Fujimori, are believed to have been the reason behind the kidnapping.

[17] For more discussion on the specific legislation, bribery cases, and military operations Fujimori's government used, please see "State Control of the Media and Its Effects on Democracy" (Mioli, 2008).

Waisbord (2000) wrote that *Caretas'* 1980s investigations of Montesinos "sparked and set the tone for subsequent exposes" (p. 47). He outlines the various investigative reports that served to inform the public about the future intelligence chief. *Caretas* reported that while serving as an army captain in the 1970s, Montesinos allegedly gave information about General Juan Velasco and the purchase of military equipment from the Soviet Union to U.S. intelligence services (Waisbord, 2000, p. 47). Eventually, the military sent him to a remote outpost. He then served time in Peruvian prison for "falsification of documents and abandoning his duty" after he falsified a travel permit to go to the United States (Waisbord, 2000, p. 48). Some of the most important *Caretas* reports on Montesinos from the 1980s revealed that he advised and defended drug traffickers and racketeers after obtaining his law degree (Waisbord, 2000, p. 48). Early in Fujimori's presidency, journalists and politicians remarked on the secrecy surrounding Montesinos. In 1993, *Caretas* editor Enrique Zileri told the Associated Press "Montesinos apparently takes great pleasure in being the gray eminence, a secretive grand monk…He hates to be photographed. He works in the shadows" (as cited in Hayes, 1993). The Associated Press journalist added context, "Except for 10-year-old photos, Peruvians had little idea of what Montesinos…looked like until a *Caretas* photographer snapped his picture at a cocktail party in December" (Hayes, 1993).

After the coup, restrictions on public information grew tighter and sources became afraid to talk. Most importantly, the government, with Montesinos at the reins, started a campaign of silencing and bribing the media. Montesinos employed tactics of surveillance and threats to silence the press and sources with potentially damning information (Conaghan, 2005, p. 143). Through operations like Plan Narval and Plan Bermuda, Montesinos and the SIN employed muggings, robberies and leaks of personal information to threaten and watch journalists like Ángel Páez and Miguel Gutiérrez of *La República's*

investigative team (Conaghan, 2005, p. 145-146). Edmundo Cruz produced a series of investigative reports revealing these operations. Montesinos also used tabloids known as the *prensa chicha* to threaten and smear critical journalists as well as assure a third presidential election victory for Fujimori. He planted stories in the tabloids or simply directed the editors to publish headlines on the covers that attacked critical journalists. Sometimes there weren't even stories inside – just a few lines of text and advertising. Conaghan (2005) writes that many of these attacks came directly after major investigative stories aired or were published. From 1998 to 1999, Páez was a frequent target of la prensa chicha, which called him a spy for the Ecuadorians and charged that he "sold his country for pennies to finance his sinful life" (Goytizolo, 2009, p. 60).

Journalists and academic work consulted for this project said that the Montesinos and Fujimori saw investigative journalism as a particular threat[18]. Investigative journalism provided a check on the pair's executive powers; it was also a medium they couldn't control, and control was what they wanted more than anything else. The reports exposed the illegal actions they carried out either to protect the country or so they have claimed, or to line their own pockets, as critics believe. Montesinos had been the subject of investigative reports starting in the early 1980s, when Gorriti started writing about his nefarious past in the military and business worlds. The stories did not let up after Montesinos became adviser to Fujimori in 1990. Cecilia Valenzuela wrote stories in *Caretas* linking him to a death-squad; Channel 2 aired reports on his high income, the intelligence service's practice of tapping phones of politicians and journalists, and links between a drug trafficker and individuals in the Army; and Páez reported stories that tied him to arms acquisitions (Felch, 2004, p. 45). After their reports, these journalists received

[18] In *Fujimori's Peru,* Catherine Conaghan elaborates on the particular threat that Montesinos saw in televised investigative reporting news programs.

threats and legal sanctions. Valenzuela received a bloody chicken at her workplace, the Israeli-born owner of Channel 2 had his citizenship revoked and ownership of his station taken from him, and Páez saw his name smeared in la prensa chicha (Felch, 2004, p. 45). As mentioned previously, Gorriti was kidnapped by heavily armed and plainclothes men on the night of the coup. Montesinos attempted to stifle investigative journalists, but the plan backfired as his attempts became the subject of the reports and examples of corruption inside the administration.

Just as the administration's treatment of journalists changed post-coup after April 1992, media coverage also changed, with some independent publications covering the government more aggressively and critically. Coverage also changed because the threat of SL diminished following Guzmán's capture. Investigative reports deemed most important from this period uncovered abuses of government power. Some journalists believed that Fujimori had violated the constitution and that Peruvians were no longer living under democracy, even despite some of the restorations of accountability mechanisms that Fujimori was pressured into by international actors.

As of March 2015, Fujimori had faced five trials for various charges of corruption, human rights abuses and bribery during his decade-long presidency. After he was extradited to Peru from Chile, the Supreme Court convicted him for ordering the illegal search of Montesinos' wife (Romero, 2007). Fujimori faced three trials in 2009. In the first, the Peruvian Supreme Court convicted him for the 1992 La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres carried out by Grupo Colina, as well as for the kidnappings of Gorriti and businessman Samuel Dyer (Romero, 2009). During the trial, various media outlets reported that Fujimori denied authorizing the massacres and kidnappings and said "I had to govern from hell" (as cited in Romero, 2009). Later that year, the court convicted the former president of giving $15 million in state funds to Montesinos ("Fujimori convicted,"

2009). And then, in September, Fujimori pleaded guilty to bribery and illegal phone-tapping of opposition politicians, journalists, and businessmen ("Fujimori pleads," 2009). In the latest trial on January 8, 2015, a panel of judges sentenced Fujimori to eight years in prison and leveled him with a $1 million fine for directing more than $40 million in public funds to la prensa chicha. Prosecutors said the funds were used to run campaigns against his 2000 presidential election opponents (Briceno, 2001).

In her analysis of how the press covered the violence of the internal war that started in 1980, Mendoza (2013) claims that, with a few exceptions, the press fell short of understanding the scope of the violence and of covering the events beyond Lima (p. 224). When the war had ended, the CVR (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación [CVR], 2003g) included in its final report a 61-page section on the media's coverage of the period. It found four distinct stages of coverage (CVR, 2003g, p. 489). The first stage was characterized by a misunderstanding of the origins of violence, which was often influenced by "the various political positions of the moment"[19] (CVR, 2003g, p. 489). The CVR (2003g) said that as part of the second stage, the proliferation of terrorist actions covered the front pages of newspapers, treating the violence as sensationalist. As a result, it claims the public was not able to form a clear picture of the facts. In the third stage, some media started to focus on presentations of violence and achieve objectivity in regards to sources and facts. Investigative reporting helped to reveal crimes perpetrated by paramilitaries and death squads. Nevertheless, the CVR (2003g) says that reports were not always neutral and were influenced by ideology. Additionally, some media treated the armed forces in cases of human rights violations with tolerance. In the final stage, from 1993 to 2000, some of the press was coopted or willingly bought by the government.

[19] "las diversas posturas políticas del momento"

A major critique of the CVR lies with some media outlet's abandonment of objectivity. The report says:

> …the CVR cannot fail to mention that throughout the stages mentioned, some media used violence commercially for their particular interests, forgetting that their primary responsibility is on objectivity and cooperation in building a balanced society. The responsibility of media from this perspective is great, because it did not help to reduce the violence and fear that seized the country, it fostered it[20] (CVR, 2003g, p. 490).

Aside from media that sensationalized violence in abandonment of objectivity, as the CVR contends above, some journalists explained that there was also abandonment of objectivity in some media's treatment of Fujimori and Montesinos. Gorriti explained that he believes objectivity is the best way to get to the truth and that many journalists claimed to be objective during the internal war, but actually failed to provide the full picture of what was happening (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 15, 2015).

> …to me it was also very clear that I had to pay a price for that and I'm to be pigeonholed as a "crusading journalist" and as an individual who had an "ax to grind" and all those things, when people, including most American journalists, were willing to go along with the lie that this was a more or less democratic government (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

The journalistic principle of objectivity is tricky and often misinterpreted in practice. Many interpret it to mean that providing equal space and time to all sides of a debate is the most fair way to achieve objectivity. However, without putting claims into context and fact checking them, the spread of false information is allowed. In the end, this is not objective.

[20] "…la CVR no puede dejar de mencionar que, a lo largo de las etapas mencionadas, se empleó comercialmente la violencia en favor de los intereses particulares de algunos medios de comunicación, olvidando que su responsabilidad principal está en la objetividad y la cooperación para la construcción de una sociedad equilibrada. La responsabilidad que tienen los medios de comunicación desde esta perspectiva es grande, pues no ayudaron a disminuir la violencia y el temor que embargó al país, sino que la fomentaron"

The CVR also criticized the press in terms of ideological biases that influenced reporting. Both Edmundo Cruz and Ricardo Uceda previously worked for left-leaning publications, including *Unidad* and *El Diario de la Marka*, respectively. In an interview with the CVR, Uceda said the following about his time as editor of *El Diario de la Marka* in the early 1980s:

> In the political press, there were many prejudices, on the side of the leftist press, Sendero was a popular target, on the side of the press of the right, there were anticommunist positions left from the Cold War […]. From this experience, I left journalism for two or three years, did not apply for a job in any media and decided to reenter fully prepared to produce professional journalism without any ideological strings[21] (as cited in CVR, 2003g, p. 494).

The CVR (2003g) then writes that Uceda "admitted the cost of the ideologies[22]" (p. 494). The report quotes Uceda saying that journalists had a hard time understanding that their analysis had to include links to poverty, social exclusion, homelessness and the "backwardness"[23] of the peasants (CVR, 2003g, p. 494). "Because the first reaction was somewhat dogmatic […]. A lesson to be drawn from this is not to be dogmatic. As a professional and intellectual exercise, we simply can't do this,"[24] Uceda said (as cited in CVR, 2003g, p. 494).

UCHURACCAY

There was an event in 1983 that cannot be attributed to the government or subversive groups, and yet it must be discussed because of the profound impact it had on

---

[21] "En la prensa política había muchos prejuicios, por el lado de la prensa izquierdista, Sendero era parte de un sector popular desviado y, por el lado de la prensa de derecha, había posiciones anticomunistas que venían de la Guerra Fría […]. A partir de esta experiencia me retiro dos o tres años del periodismo activo, no solicito trabajo en ningún medio y decido reentrar totalmente dispuesto a hacer periodismo profesional sin ningún tipo de atadura ideológica."

[22] "el peso que tenían las ideologías"

[23] "atraso"

[24] "Porque la primera reacción fue un tanto dogmática […]. Una lección que hay que sacar de todo esto es no ser dogmático. Como ejercicio profesional e intelectual, no podemos serlo"

the journalism community early in the conflict. On January 26, 1983, eight journalists and a guide in the Ayacucho village of Uchuraccay were killed. SL and the military had been vying for control of the area and using the townspeople in their efforts (Mensch, 2009). The final report from a commission formed to investigate the massacre concluded that community members killed the journalists and guide, mistaking them for members of SL. Later media reports cast doubt on that explanation, with many journalists and publications rejecting the official conclusions of the government and the commission. In the months following the massacre, 135 villagers lost their lives because of conflict between rural patrols, SL and state security forces (CVR, 2003d, p. 121). For months afterward, photos of corpses of the deceased and marchers in downtown Lima covered the front of Lima-based newspapers and magazines. Most notably, reporters and readers of *Caretas* did not condemn the villagers for murdering their colleagues, taking into account the widespread fear of the community. In the February 7 edition, a reader wrote "Guilty are all of us who did not do anything for them and then we were horrified by what they do"[25] (Chiappe, 1983,p. 1). Mendoza (2013) argues that the press had such a strong reaction to what happened at Uchuraccay for reasons beyond the fact that the deceased were colleagues. Also at stake was an escalation in terrorist activity, confusion created in the emergency zone and the rest of the country, and the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency efforts (p. 247).

Uchuraccay would not be the final instance in which journalists were killed during the violence of the period. In 2002, the National Association of Journalists of Peru asked the CVR to investigate the cases of more than fifty journalists who were disappeared or killed during the internal war. Those cases are still being investigated. Halfway through

[25] "Culpables somos todos nosotros, los que no hicimos nada por ellos y que luego nos horrorizamos de los que ellos hacen."

the internal war, the association had released a book detailing SL, violence, narcotrafficking, and the press. Journalists reported that members of the press had become targets of terrorist and narcotrafficking violence and that some deaths had been linked to security forces, according to Alvaro Alvaro Rojas Samanez (Blanco & Rojas, 1990, p. 11). He asked, "Why are there dead journalists? The answer is obvious: because they fulfilled their duty to inform. Simple and overwhelming reality. They die, or better said: they killed them, because they fulfilled their duty to inform" (Blanco & Rojas, 1990, p. 11).

Peruvians are still waiting for justice in the cases of some deaths. Family and friends of *Caretas* correspondent Hugo Bustíos may finally get some answers about his. Retired General Daniel Urresti and until recently Minister of the Interior[26], is under investigation for the 1988 murder of Bustíos (Mioli, 2014). Bustíos was killed in Ayacucho when Army members shot him and then placed an explosive device on his body. News reports said he was killed for taking a photo of a commander accused of disappearing sixty people. At the time of the killing, Urresti was intelligence chief in that region. In March 2015, Urresti was formally charged with Bustíos' murder and the prosecuting attorney announced that he would seek a sentence of 25 years in prison (Mioli, 2014). At the same time, the Peruvian political world has been speculating that Urresti might be a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. This investigation is yet another example of the potential ties that current government officials have to the corrupted governments of the 1980s and 90s and the slow pace of justice for victims of the internal war's violence. With this background, I now consider how journalists practiced investigative reporting during the internal war in spite of political violence and governmental restrictions.

[26] Urresti was replaced as Minister of the Interior in February 2015.

CHAPTER 3: Practices

> …the virtues of the investigative journalist are persistence and suspicion. (Schudson, 2008, p. 15)

EMERGENCE OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM IN PERU

Peruvian journalists and academics respond with the names of a few journalists and outlets when asked about the country's most effective and influential investigative journalists who worked during the internal war: Gustavo Gorriti, Angel Páez, Ricardo Uceda, Edmundo Cruz, Cecilia Valenzuela, and César Hildebrandt, as journalists, and *Caretas, La República, Sí, Oiga, Contrapunto,* and *La Clave* as publications. These journalists, outlets and news programs found themselves in the minority during the internal war as most reporters failed to go beyond the basic facts or actively misled the public with disinformation after receiving bribes from the government. Edmundo Cruz summarizes the role of journalism during the internal war: "In the 80s and 90s, in the situation of violence that the country lived in, [journalism] had the role of inquirer, the oversight role, the investigative role. No? In these years, investigative journalism developed in Peru"[27] (E. Cruz Vílchez, personal interview, July 15, 2014).

Investigative journalism in Peru developed at about the same time as the practice took hold in Latin America. Waisbord (2000) agrees that investigative journalism continued to operate in Peru after the Fujimori coup, but was limited to a handful of publications (p. xxi). I can update and expand on some of Waisbord's 2000 conclusions about the power of investigative journalism during this period. He said that investigative reports did not trigger major political crises in Peru as it did in other South American

[27] "En los años 80 y 90, por la situación de violencia que vivir el país, se hace y tuvo el rol indagatorio, el rol fiscalizador, el rol investigativo. No? En esos años…se desarrolló el periodismo de investigación en el Perú."

countries. Since he published in 2000, Waisbord did not have the benefit of witnessing the numerous trials of officials, including Fujimori and Montesinos, which came about in part because of the efforts of investigative journalists.

Though investigative reporting surely existed in addition to print media and in locations outside of Lima, for this project I focus on Lima-based print media and the outlets and journalists most widely regarded as having written reports that uncovered major cases of wrongdoing or threats unknown to the public. Within Lima, there were three important print outlets that produced investigative reports during this period that I will not focus on due to space and time limitations. They are the newspaper of record *El Comercio* and the magazines *Oiga* and *Ojo.* Here I focus on the magazine *Caretas* and *Sí,* as well as newspaper *La República.*

PUBLICATIONS

Caretas

Caretas, a weekly news magazine that focuses mostly on politics, business, life and arts (and Lima gossip) was one of the few sources of investigative journalism critical of both the state and non-state actors during the internal conflict. *Caretas* has "a long history of denunciation of political corruption and malpractice across party lines" and is an important shaper of public opinion, according to David Wood (2000, p. 21). Journalists at *Caretas* frequently targeted the García and Fujimori administrations in investigative articles. A significant portion of the coverage concerned links between drug trafficking and the government. Starting in 1982, the magazine published a series of articles by Gorriti investigating millionaire Carlos Langberg, his involvement with cocaine trafficking, and his ties to APRA. Starting early in the internal war, the magazine focused on how the security forces responded to violent attacks carried out by Sendero Luminoso (SL). The

magazine also worked to lift the veil on the ideology and military tactics of these guerrilla groups and their attempts to overthrow the state. Editor Enrique Zileri played an active role in laying out the editorial tone of many investigative articles that drew the ire of the Fujimori administration. Gorriti recalled that "In *Caretas*, if I have any problems with the publisher or the editor [it was because they were] all the time prodding for more productivity and more output and deeper investigations…[Zileri] was teaching, pushing, cajoling and otherwise trying to increase the quantity and quality of reporting" (as cited in Mioli, 2008, p. 19).

Government repression of outlets producing investigative reports was especially harsh during the Fujimori administration. As a result of its critical coverage of guerrilla groups and the state, *Caretas* became the object of economic, legislative and judicial restrictions at the hands of the government. Vladimiro Montesinos, who acted as Fujimori's de facto chief of intelligence, filed a defamation suit against *Caretas* director Zileri in 1991 after the magazine published an article critical of him. Zileri also said that in 1992, the government was applying increased import duties on the magazine's paper imports (Wood, 2000, p. 29). In 1998, Zileri and *Caretas* reporter César Hildebrandt joined other journalists and congressmen in reaction to government interference by filing a case with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging that the national intelligence and army intelligence agencies wiretapped and threatened journalists and politicians (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2001).

La República

Gustavo Mohme founded the newspaper *La República* in 1981. The publication "pioneered a style which blended news, lengthy features and analysis, investigative reporting and provocative headlines in a tabloid format" (Schmidt, 2000, p. 13). In 1985,

La República journalist Ángel Páez was invited to the University of Arizona in Tucson for a special course in investigative journalism (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). His teachers included Jacqueline Sharkey, an investigative journalist reporting on Latin America at the time, and Pulitzer Prize-winner Virginia Escalante of the *Los Angeles Times.* When he returned to Peru, he proposed an investigative team of four journalists to the editors at the left-leaning *La República* (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). The idea was to have a team dedicated to investigative reporting - distinct points of view, one team. There were no deadlines. The story was finished when the investigation was done. Investigative reporting had existed in Peru previous to the formation of the team, but was practiced by individuals. Páez explained, "I found it interesting to improve the quality of information and to have information that the other newspapers didn't have. We specialized in issues with these characteristics: corruption, organized crime, human rights violations, narco-trafficking, intelligence, environmental change, all of these subjects"[28] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). Convincing the powers at *La República* of the necessity and desirability of an investigative team was difficult. Paéz had to show that it was possible to create a different type of product with a "commando team of journalists" (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). He proposed the team in 1988, but it wasn't until 1990 that the unit published their first story. Some older editors did not see the importance in the young team's work and regarded the reporting as nothing new, Páez recalled (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). But Páez acknowledges that all changed with Fujimori's autogolpe on April 5, 1992 when military groups entered the offices of *La República* and declared war. The

[28] "Me pareció interesante para mejora la calidad de información y para tener información que los otros diarios no tenían, especializarnos en temas, de estas características: corrupción, criminal organizado, violación de derechos humanos, narcotráficos, servicios secretos, cambio medio ambiental, todas de estas temas."

magazine then dedicated a team to investigating the government. "…in 1992, the dictatorship of Fujimori and Montesinos started. This marked our work until 2000. In this period, we were frequently attacked by the government of Fujimori and Montesinos because we dedicated ourselves to investigating crime and corruption"[29] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014).

That first investigative team included Mónica Vecco, Francisco Mattos, Francisco Reyes, and Páez. Journalists focused on different themes, like drugs and political violence or security forces and police. Robin Kirk wrote about the team for the *Columbia Journalism Review* in 1991 shortly after it formed. She was on assignment at an army base in Castropampa when she came across the team that she says was "a thorn in the side…to the powerful in Peru" (Kirk, 1991, p. 37). Kirk describes talking with the base commander who was upset with a recent story produced by the unit concerning the base. She recalls "He was not pleased: other newspapers, he said, are content to publish military press releases, and do not go nosing into what is none of their business" (Kirk, 1991, p. 38). The unit was built around two-person teams that worked in the field, but returned to Lima before the story broke in order to reduce risk. According to Kirk, journalists in the unit complained about low salaries, small expense accounts and disagreements with management about reporting topics. Still, Kirk (1991) said they continued because of "a sense that their work makes a difference in Peru" (p. 38). Other investigative teams formed in Lima in the 1990s, but Páez's team was the first[30].

[29] "Dos años después, el año 92, comenzó la dictadura de Fujimori y Montesinos. Eso marcó nuestro trabajo hasta el año 2000. En ese periodo nosotros fuimos atacados mucho por el gobierno de Fujimori y Montesinos porque nos dedicamos a investigar crimines y corrupción."

[30] In 1994, Ricardo Uceda started an investigative unit at *El Comercio.*

Sí

Carlos Maraví Gutarra started *Sí* in 1987 and it was the "leading independent magazine" in the country (Mendoza, 2013, p. 186). Noted investigative journalist César Hildebrandt was director until 1989. Two stories mark the contributions of *Sí* during the internal war. Ricardo Uceda, Edmundo Cruz and others working at *Sí* in 1992 and 1993 reported that senior military officials were responsible for mass killings of students perceived to be subversives by the Peruvian government. Their reports later revealed that a death squad identified as Grupo Colina had carried out the assassinations that became known as the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres. In 2009, the Peruvian Supreme Court convicted Fujimori for ordering both of these incidents.

Like Gorriti, Cruz is self-taught in journalistic methods. He studied *Letras* at the University of San Marcos, but did not finish. He describes himself as an autodidact – ie. as self-taught in the technical aspects and the doctrines of journalism (E. Cruz Vílchez, personal interview, July 15, 2014). He worked at various media outlets, including *El Mundo, El Sol* and *La Razón*[31], before Uceda invited him to work at *Sí* in 1989 where he covered politics, focusing on security and violence. In July 1996, he joined the investigative unit at *La República* where he covered the same beats. It is important to understand journalists' motivations and how they see their role in Peruvian society. Cruz said he was attracted to journalism due to an interest in helping confront the social, economic and political issues facing the country (E. Cruz Vílchez, personal interview, July 15, 2014). He calls it a "social vocation." "This type of vocation has always accompanied me. And that led me first to political activity. And then when I became disenchanted with

[31] *La Razón* was a fleeting venture that lasted just a little more than a month. It was a leftist newspaper that was started to help the reelection of Alfonso Barrantes Lingán for mayor of Lima. Ricardo Uceda also worked at the paper (Mendoza, 2013, p. 221).

political activity, I went to journalism because I saw a way to develop my social vocation"[32] (E. Cruz Vílchez, personal interview, July 15, 2014).

PRACTICING INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM DURING LA GUERRA INTERNA

If investigative journalists reveal corruption and injustice, it follows that there will be a detrimental effect to the well-being of society if the government restricts and interferes with such revelations. Therefore, it is important to understand how outlets like *Caretas*, *La República,* and *Sí* navigated a repressive environment in order to inform the public about political violence (whether carried out by state or non-state actors) that threatened public safety and the overall stability of the country, as well as government corruption that compromised the status of democracy. All of the publications mentioned here successfully resisted challenges to press freedom by encouraging strong investigative journalism practices, such as the cultivation of sources and extensive historical and social research, and by actively using the legal system and court of public opinion to call attention to the repressive actions of the government. I discuss these methods at length below.

Context: Understanding the Story

One of the main contributions of investigative journalism is that it can provide a context for facts. By its very nature, it is a type of journalism that focuses on providing answers to the questions of how and why. Páez said in 1991, "Before the *Unidad* was formed, most of what we published didn't go beyond the simple recitation of figures – how many dead and this many buckets of blood" (as cited in Kirk, 1991, p. 38). In order to provide context, investigative reporters spend hours in the field interviewing and observing

[32] Ese tipo de vocación es el que me acompañado siempre. Y el que me llevo primero la actividad política y después cuando me desencanté de la actividad política, pasé a la actividad periodística porque vi en la actividad periodística una manera de desarrollar mi vocación social."

and even more time pouring over research and documents. A disciplined and extensive information gathering process was essential for Gorriti in order to understand the context of the internal war.

> It really meant talking with dozens and dozens of people, trying to reconstruct the more subtle nuances of reality. The background, the past, the history. The person, the group as well as the ideological aspects and so it wasn't just the coverage of explicit events, it was covering a whole process that was translated into daily or weekly different events (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

Gorriti produced many of the investigative reports on SL prior to the government's acknowledgement of the group's threat to the state. Despite all of the reports he has written on the guerrilla group and the book that he completed based on hundreds of military and subversive documents, Gorriti said he initially was not as eager to cover SL.

> At first I was a sort of reluctant reporter on Sendero…I really wanted to do some international analysis, and more than anything to write about literature, to write about writers, the art of writing, creation, and all of that. But, of course, others didn't want to do that and the subject had interested me (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

As a practitioner of martial arts, he added that his physical abilities also meant that could be willing to face some dangers that other reporters would or could not. Gorriti said he initially perceived the group's actions as lacking the "dashing nature" of other Latin American guerrilla groups. He felt pity for the poor students who had a fever for this ideology that would cause them to "throw their lives into nothingness" (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). But, Gorriti had read extensively about revolutionary process and had knowledge of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism.

One day, a high-level Catholic priest and intellectual contacted him and said someone brought him documents that were "disquieting" and possibly dangerous to have; he offered the documents to Gorriti (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). The journalist described piles upon piles of documents carefully classified by subject and date

that SL had copied that were related to the Communist Party in Peru and *los organismos generados*, which he explained were legal or semi-legal in nature and served as political fronts for the organization (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). In all of Gorriti's free time, he began to read the documents, to do more research and to realize the importance of the insurgency; "…there was a plan, there was a strategy that was extremely serious. It was far, far more serious than any of the other more dashing and spectacular guerrilla insurgencies elsewhere. And from that moment on, I began to cover it in a most serious and earnest way" (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

Gorriti said the process to understand SL was not easy since it was an atypical insurgency in Latin American terms. Part of the struggle in writing about SL was finding a term to define them. Gorriti said he tried not to use a single term when reporting on the group, but instead to use the "right qualification that corresponded with the reality of the fact of the event I was reporting on" (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014). The groups used acts of terrorism, sabotage, propaganda, guerrilla action, or a combination of all of these.

> So it was very clear that underneath it all, there was an insurgency, an armed insurgency or insurrection that had an ideology, a method, a strategy, and aims that were both physical and metaphysical. And, to me, it was very important to make that clear to people. If I just pigeonholed them as terrorists, it would be very hard to help people understand the complexity of the organization, the phenomenon that they were facing. So I didn't and I was one of the few who didn't call them terrorists as a matter of fact (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

Gorriti then started to use the term "internal war" when the insurgency reached the level of a national security issue for Peru.

Another challenge was determining how to talk about the countryside of Peru where a majority of the political violence was taking place. As mentioned previously, there has long been a traditional divide between limeño society and life in the provincial areas. Many

limeños held prejudiced or simply uninformed attitudes toward the people living in rural Peru. As a limeño writing for limeños, Gorriti reflected on his portrayals of the countryside:

> I have to say when I went into some of those areas, really one of the challenges, was to get out of the usual ways of depicting the rural countryside, especially the rural Andean countryside. There was the kind of the prose even in social sciences that put a detachment, an automatic detachment, and [so I tried] to make people in Lima and elsewhere, on the contrary, feel their very close kinship with those people and what was happening with them, make people hear, understand, if not feel the pain and the anguish of those living there (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

Investigative journalists like Gorriti and frequent collaborator and photographer Oscar Medrano described the suffering and devastation experienced in the rural areas by finding those affected and telling their stories. Through narrative, they created a personal connection and then utilized photos and sound to create a fuller picture and more points of contact with the reader. By researching the writings of SL and working to figure out the ideology, they escaped the trap of other media whose coverage of the group was superficial and eventually led to misunderstandings among the public about the true threat of SL. Páez told me, "I really liked getting [Sendero's] documents, their biological and political writings. I reviewed, investigated, and looked, to understand their logic…I had copies and looked to understand the ideology, the organization, how they were, and what they did, I pondered that"[33] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014).

Procurement of Sources

Once Gorriti dedicated himself to the topic, he worked to form and maintain links to both state security officials and members of the left (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April

[33] "A mi me gustaba mucho conseguir sus documentos, sus escritos biológicos y políticos. Yo revisaba, investigaba, y buscaba, buscaba, entender su lógica…Yo tenía copias y buscaba comprender la ideología, la organización, como estaban, y que es lo que hacían, que meditaba eso."

6, 2014). Investigative journalists must cultivate multiple sources if they desire to go beyond the surface of an issue or event. They do not tell just what happened; they also look at why and how it happened. He established informants in the police, the military and the national intelligence service. "And you also needed to have sources from within the left and other political forces. And it wasn't that easy. You had to cultivate. And very much, you had to read a lot of what they did. And you had to talk with them. It was extremely difficult," Gorriti said (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). To form ties to sources, Gorriti saw trust as the number one priority; he said he never broke confidentiality of his sources. Even if he and the source disagreed "on everything, on everything on this earth" they could trust his word (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014). He caught a "lucky break" into the clandestine SL organization while on a reporting trip to El Frontón prison in 1982. He traveled to the island prison to interview a prisoner not associated with SL, but ended up touring the prison and meeting with Senderistas who had taken control of much of the facility[34] (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). Against the advice of prison personnel, he went to the pavilion largely controlled by SL prisoners and witnessed and recorded their disciplined recitation of Marxist slogans and revolutionary songs they adapted to their cause. They eventually invited him for a tour of the conditions of their living facilities and an hour-long discussion of their revolution. "They were completely forthright and frank, in everything. 'Do we kill? Yes we kill. The party has to kill. But we don't kill anybody, we only kill the cockroaches. Those that serve the vile

[34] "And when I arrived at El Frontón, I didn't expect to see what I witnessed. The Shining Path people, essentially in charge of the inner closure of the main pavilion where they were being held, and the Republican Guard, it was one of the three police institutions at the time, just in the surrounding towers, and the civilian employees of the jail system in between, and negotiating with the Shining Path people on issues of food and visits and this and that. I asked the director of the prison, a man that had extensive experience, he had had all kinds of political prisoners before, Apristas, Populistas, Comunistas, everything, and I asked whether these people were in any way comparable with the tough political prisoners of yesteryear, like the Apristas for instance. He said to me 'The Apristas are nothing in comparison with this'"

interests of Perro Belaúnde…,'" Gorriti recalled in an April 2014 interview[35] (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). They also talked about politics and their organization, "repeating in a very disciplined way the party line that was handed in a very meticulous way to him" (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). It was an eye-opening interview during which Gorriti heard the rigid and organized reasoning that was passed down to cadres from Guzmán. Stories from that trip eventually landed as a series in *Caretas* and on radio news programs throughout Lima. After that, Gorriti was sometimes approached by "democratic lawyers"[36] who paid him visits (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). He said he also found places where he could buy copies of the outlawed SL propaganda publication *El Diario.* Eventually, someone found where he lived and started putting the paper directly under his door (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

The interview described above, and others that Gorriti carried out with important SL leaders and influencers such as Efraín Morote Best, is a combination of investigative and explanatory journalism. As numerous analysts and historians have found, there were great misunderstandings among the government, security forces, media, and society as to the motives and ideology behind SL's actions. Gorriti's work explained that the group was incredibly organized behind a concise political ideology. Through these interviews, Peruvians began to understand where the group fell in comparison to the legal left and within the global context of the communist movement. One of the most important explanations his stories revealed was that the group's violence was not aimless. It was a tool to overturn the democratic system and the existing political structure of the country.

---

[35] In this personal interview, Gorriti paraphrases quotes from his stories originally published in *Caretas.* For the exact quotes, see original articles.

[36] The Asociación Nacional de Abogados Democraticos del Perú (The National Association of Democratic Lawyers of Peru) frequently represented prisoners suspected of being members of Sendero Luminoso.

The presence of opposition within the Fujimori government made it possible to find high-level sources with credible information that uncovered his abuses – this also goes to the fact that Fujimori was a populist leader without party support and structure. As Kruijt (2001) emphasized, Fujimori relied on the support of the military and did not build much of a party or support structure. Infighting in the military as well as disagreements about counterinsurgency strategy created sources who were willing and eager to uncover abuses of power within the government. These sources leaked documents and provided interviews that made their way into investigative reports through the use of pseudonyms in place of their true names.

Determining Credibility

Investigative journalists during this period ran into problems commonly faced by reporters working on sensitive topics, namely, reliance on anonymous sources and the task of determining credibility. Because of the political environment and potential negative consequences for outspoken sources, many insisted on being anonymous. Investigative journalists agree that their work would have been impossible during Fujimori's regime were it not for anonymous sources. Páez points to a lack of government transparency and access to information, as well as government attacks on journalists as reasons for reliance on anonymous sources (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). Waisbord (2000) takes a decidedly critical and negative view of the use of anonymous sources. He argues that investigative journalists are often dependent on official sources, meaning employees of government institutions (p. 95). This results in increased power for elite voices. Therefore, Waisbord (2000) contends that the use of anonymous sources further empowers official sources because it "legitimizes the interests of powerful sources in spilling information without revealing their identity, and it allows journalism to disclose

wrongdoing without disclosing its own practices" (p. 98). Without knowing the identity of the source, the public (ie. readers) cannot then make judgments as to his credibility. It has the overall impact of lessening transparency. Yet, if the political environment makes it so that sources are so afraid of speaking out, can journalists make exceptions for anonymous sources? We see in the case of investigative journalists like Páez, Gorriti, and Cruz that thorough cross checking and a healthy skepticism of sources and their motives can result in accurate, credible, and effective investigative journalism produced with the use of anonymous sources.

As mentioned earlier, the Fujimori government, in particular, spent considerable time and money buying media editorial lines and threatening independent journalists to the point of self-censorship. Páez confirmed that Montesinos sometimes tried to use sources to manipulate information. "One time, they tricked Edmundo and I, they gave us false information… they wanted to test how far we had contact"[37] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). Montesinos wanted to know who their sources were. The contentious political environments meant there would be officials jockeying for power and showing an eagerness to discredit enemies. Therefore, it was essential to question the motivations of the source providing information. Relaying inaccurate information is dangerous business, and a journalist who allows himself to be used as a mouthpiece for government or opposition propaganda works against what we understand as democratic functions of the press.

Part of determining whether a source is relaying accurate information involves cross-checking information with documents, audio, video, photos, and other human sources. This clearly involves a lot of leg work on the part of the journalist. Páez said that

[37] "Una vez, Edmundo y a mi nos engañaron, nos dieron una información falsa…Era para saber, querían probar hasta dónde nosotros teníamos contacto…"

if a source had documents to back up what he was saying, that information could be more reliable (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). However, the journalist still needs to cross data in order to verify. Páez cautions against publishing 100 percent of what a source says; he only publishes what can be verified[38] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). That may involve asking another source if the information is correct or showing them a document to check its authenticity. Journalists agree that relying on one source for a story is very dangerous. Abstaining from publishing 100 percent of what the source says is also in the interest of the source in that it keeps the journalist from revealing his identity. If a source sees that you did not respect the agreement, they might disappear (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). Páez said that the unit has had sources in the armed forces for many years because of this practice (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014).

Additionally, journalists must keep distance from their sources. For Páez, this meant taking care with whom he was seen (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). Some journalists would go in helicopters or cars with the military. Páez said that this leads to a loss of independence and a loss of sources. He explains:

> …it also allowed us to have sources within the government and within the army. Do you understand why? Because if a military source sees me with the boss, number 1 of the army…[he will say] "I don't tell you, I don't give you information. You are with him. I don't trust you"[39] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014).

For this reason, the journalists' sources tended to be low-ranking officers. Waisbord (2000) acknowledges a paradox in maintaining distance from sources. Journalists need sources in order to uncover wrongdoing and so must maintain relationships, but they also need

[38] Waisbord confirms this practice of verification and avoidance of single source stories in *Watchdog Journalism, p.* 99.

[39] "Entonces, porque eso ademas nos permitia tener fuentes dentro del gobierno y dentro el ejercito. Entiendes porque? Porque si una fuente militar que me ve con el jefe, number 1 del ejercito… 'ya no te cuento, ya no te doy información. Tú estás con él. No te confían.'"

distance to ensure they are not being complacent (p. 93). In order to maintain the balance, Waisbord (2000) argues that the political economy of the news outlet and the social organization and culture of news production must be monitored (p. 93).

Editorial Independence

In any mention of his experience working at *Caretas*, Gorriti quickly turns the conversation to the influence of the magazine's executive editor and publisher Enrique Zileri Gibson. Gorriti (2011) wrote "…the greatest hazard a Latin American investigative journalist faces is an internal one. It is the censorship and sabotage that emanates from the top of the enterprise – the owners and managers – trickling down through pliable editors until it settles into frequently corrupted newsrooms" (p. 61). He credits Zileri's insistence on exclusive and thorough investigative reports for the quality of reporting produced at that time.

When Gorriti published his article "Living Dangerously: Issues of Peruvian Press Freedom" in 1993, he sought to answer why a majority of the media outlets fell in line with the Fujimori administration after the coup and declined to defend democracy. He found the answer to be editorial independence. He looked at important producers of investigative reports during the era, *Caretas*, *Oiga*, and *Sí*, and found that the owners of the first two magazines did not have significant investments outside of the publications and that a de facto separation between editor and publisher existed in the last magazine (Gorriti, 1993, p. 240-241). Scholars of liberal press theory also emphasize that editors and publishers should maintain certain distances from the market in order to maintain editorial independence.

CHALLENGES

Threats from Subjects

Since investigative journalists uncover information that certain people have a vested interest in keeping secret, it is logical that attempts to silence journalists might wellprecede or follow the publication of that information. When extreme violence is part of the arsenal of the people working to keep the information secret, investigative journalists are even more likely to become targets of that violence. This was the case for many investigative reporters who worked during the internal war. Therefore, the journalists who took on the task of uncovering secrets knew that personal risk was part of the job.

> So, it was clear what kind of magazine was *Caretas* and what kind of people we were. So we had to be strong, we had to be able to go, to get there, to see lots of violence and suffering and sometimes in a more or less dangerous way and we had to try to get out and then be able to make it back to write about it (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

Because of their work, Páez recounted that journalists were caught between narco-traffickers, terrorists, the military and police. He and members of his team, including Edmundo Cruz and Francisco Reyes, were targets of threats, beatings, and attempted killings; most of the threats originated from the military and SL (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). SL most frequently delivered their threats face-to-face, Páez said. Melissa Goytizolo Castro conducted extensive interviews with Páez and his colleagues for her book, *El Perseguidor: La peligrosa vida del periodista Ángel Páez.* In one section, she tells about a trip to Huancayo in 1989 when Páez and *La República* photographer Virgilio Grajeda went to La Universidad Nacional del Centro to research a story on the presence of Senderistas at the university, as well as the disappearance of some students (Goytizolo, 2009, p. 45-46). As they were getting ready to return to their hotel after reporting, a group of eight Senderistas ambushed the two journalists and accused them

of being intelligence agents. They pushed them to the floor and held them at gunpoint while they took their documents, cameras, recorders, notes, and wallets. They discussed whether or not to kill them for more than an hour before letting them go, according to Goytizolo (2009, p. 46-47). Later that night, Páez convinced Grajeda to grab something to eat and to catch a glimpse of the Senderistas that met in the plaza. The same men who had threatened them earlier saw them and signaled with their hand "so as to say, 'you know, whatever you publish, goodbye'"[40] (Goytizolo, 2009, p. 47). Goytizolo reminded the reader that the Senderistas had papers with the addresses of the journalists and their families. A few days after the two returned to Lima, someone called the investigative unit at *La República* and said "'Tell Páez not to be stupid or we will kill him'"[41] (Goytizolo, 2009, p. 47). A few days after that, the official newspaper for SL threatened Páez by name. Goytizolo (2009) writes that SL attempted to kill Páez five times (p. 48).

How to Report on Political Violence

I have established that political violence permeated all aspects of the internal war; it was an important tool for both SL's revolution and the government's counterinsurgency strategy. I have also recounted that journalists and their sources frequently became the targets of this violence. There was meaning and motivation behind the use of violence. As a result, media outlets and journalists had to determine how to report on political violence. Some outlets established precise rules concerning coverage, while others were guided by broader guidelines.

Gorriti said that *Caretas* did not have specific guidelines concerning how to cover political violence (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014). Writers frequently had meetings and discussions concerning the issue. According to Gorriti, finding an exclusive

[40] "'ya saben, cualquier cosa que publiquen, adiós'"
[41] "'Dile a Páez que no haga estupideces o los matamos.'"

and strong story was essential, but so was respecting the subjects of the story (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014). This involved restraint as well as knowing when to ask certain questions and when those questions would compound suffering. Covering extreme violence and pain was sometimes part of the job, but it could not be done in a "sort of yellow press approach" (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

In the early 1990s, various media outlets met to discuss coverage of political violence. Television stations reduced the amount of time allotted for covering the events. Some made the decision to reduce or change the placement of articles and photos about attacks by SL. The decision was and is still controversial. Páez said that, at the time, he did not think it was a good idea. "It is not journalism…It is not ethical, to hide. Hiding is not ethical"[42] (Á. Páez, personal interview, July 25, 2014). When asked about this practice, Gorriti spoke with passion, echoing Páez's sentiments:

> [it] was anti-journalism…And any newspaper that makes a virtue out of disinformation should be out of the business and the problem is that they were the newspaper of record in Peru. And the reason that it was, they didn't want to play into the aims of the 'terrorists' and it's an excuse that falls on its face. We had an objective situation of an insurgency. We had an objective situation of a war. Tens of thousands of people were suffering on a daily basis…There was tremendous material damage, there was loss of life at all times and it was increasingly evident, even for the hard of understanding, that there was the kind of struggle where the fate of Peru would be decided…People didn't understand why, who, for what reasons they were doing what they were doing. And so, one of the essential things of journalism, not just telling them what, but why, was also left unsaid" (G. Gorriti, personal interview, July 23, 2014).

[42] "No es periodismo…No es ético, ocultar, Hiding is not ethical."

Having explored how journalists researched and produced investigative reports despite increasing violence and governmental restrictions, I next examine specific reports that uncovered threats to Peruvian democracy.

CHAPTER 4: Investigative Reports and Their Impact

When we had to go back to Cieneguilla, I was afraid, no? What protections did we have? None. And obviously we had played with the lion's beard.[43]
(E. Cruz as cited in the trailer for *La Cantuta en la boca del diablo*)

This chapter combines textual analysis of a select group of investigative reports by some of the investigative journalists discussed in the previous chapter, including insight from those journalists concerning the information gathering- and editorial processes. By analyzing use of language, editing and narrative styles, description of the actors and the use of images, I aim to answer a number of questions about the practice of investigative journalism during the internal conflict. A particular focus is how journalists were able to navigate an unfriendly environment to communicate information about acts of political violence to the wider community. When reporters cover political violence while in a virulent environment themselves, do we see changes in language, treatment of sources or patterns of coverage? Is there a correlation between critical reporting and retaliation by the government? What are the long-term effects of producing critical journalism in a violent and authoritarian political environment?

Gustavo Gorriti's Coverage of Sendero Luminoso

Gorriti's stories of SL's initial actions in the years 1981 to 1983 informed many limeños who lacked any knowledge of what was happening in the countryside or who grossly misunderstood the situation. During this time, he used multiple investigative methods to explain the ideology and motivations behind a movement that operated on secrecy. He interviewed family members of Guzmán's wife and was able to attach a face to the movement by obtaining old family photos of the leader (Gorriti, 1983a). He combed

[43] "Cuando tuvimos que volver a Cieneguilla, me dío miedo no? que protección teníamos nosotros? Ninguna. Y obviamente le habíamos tocaba la barba de león."

Guzmán's thesis from the National University of San Agustin de Arequipa in order to understand the leader's opposition to the electoral process and the movements efforts to suppress voting (Gorriti, 1983c). He interviewed SL leaders in prison who explained the motives behind their war (Gorriti, 1982a). In many of his reports, he spoke in the first-person narrative; for example, he did so when he traveled to Ayacucho to monitor the police and military actions in the area and to interview indigenous community members. Gorriti went to Huamanga with the Sinchis in 1981 to see how the police were combatting SL's spread in the emergency zone (Gorriti, 1981). He wrote about hiking to Huanta in the hopes of reaching Uchuraccay to cover judicial proceedings in the community (Gorriti, 1983b). He produced special reports on the police forces (Gorriti, 1982b), and later, the Army, in order to understand their counterinsurgency tactics (Gorriti & Portocarrero, 1983a). Here, I examine a handful of his articles published in *Caretas* during that time period in order to see how he portrayed political violence and the threat of SL. Some of his reports employ more investigative techniques than others, but all are important in revealing a comprehensive picture of SL and how the group used violence in its goal to overthrow the existing democratic system of government.

Massacre at Lucanamarca – April 3, 1983

Members of SL used axes, machetes and guns to kill 69 peasant men, women, and children in and around Santiago de Lucanamarca on April 3, 1983.[44] The cover of the April 11 edition of *Caretas*, the first issue published after the event, featured a photo of a shirtless man who is facing to the side with his back turned to the camera. There were two large gauze pads taped to the back of his head and his upper back. The word "Genocidio," printed in large red letters and repeated seven times, covers the page behind him. The subtitle: "En

[44] The peasants later murdered a Sendero Luminoso commander in the town square; media reported that it was an act of retaliation.

Lucanamarca." The photographic depictions of political violence that covered the pages of *Caretas* in the 1980s and 1990s vividly illustrated the reality of the internal conflict for limeños who had little to no direct experience with the actions of the state security forces or guerrillas terrorizing the countryside.

Gorriti and Benito Portocarrero (1983b) wrote the main article covering Lucanamarca and based their coverage on audio recordings captured by photographer Oscar Medrano. This case illustrates how journalists had to adapt to access restrictions in rural Peru. In an April 2014 interview, Gorriti explained that he and Medrano were in Ayacucho during the attack. After news of the massacre reached them, they approached General Clemente Noel in with the Peruvian Army and asked if he was travelling to Lucanamarca (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). There was room for only one person in the military helicopter, so Medrano, an Ayacucho native and Quechua speaker, took Gorriti's tape recorder so that they could retrieve sound and photos. Once the group arrived at Lucanamarca, Noel and other military officials met with the local townspeople. Gorriti said that the most respected leaders of the community gave an account of what happened (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

> And they spoke in the oratorical tones that in the provinces local leaders could tend to have when talking with the great authority coming from Lima…And of course, this slightly formal tone, was mixed, combined with telling of the greatest tragedy that they have lived in generations, which had happened just a few hours ago with the blood still fresh, with people still pointing, as you probably saw the photo, the places to which the blood had sort of leapt as people were cut or axed (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

Gorriti described that the leaders' voices would crack as they remembered the violence of the day; when he provides detail about that day more than thirty years later, he is so specific that it is clear he has listened to the voices on the tapes dozens of times in the last decades. After the meeting, Noel said that he would relay the information to the

president and that they would try to help, but that he was returning to Ayacucho. Gorriti said that as the helicopter rotor began to turn, the people began to cry "like a Greek choir"; the man who might save them from further violence was not staying (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014). For his reporting in *Caretas*, Gorriti supplemented the information from these tapes with interviews of Noel and other military officers, as well as Medrano. Lima radio stations later hosted Gorriti and played the tapes from the town meeting (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

In the article, Gorriti and Portocarrero (1983b) placed the focus on the people affected rather than solely relying on clinical details on how the guerrillas carried out the violence. They told the story of the event through members of families and offered a chronological narrative of the proceedings, a style repeated later in *Caretas'* coverage of political violence where the victims were members of the public. Notable in this article are uses of the terms genocida and solidaridad, which would be part of the discourse in later coverage of "terrorist" events. The term "solidaridad" takes on an additional meaning when we consider the historical divide between the limeños reading the article and the rural community members who are the subject. The writers compared members of SL to Pol Pot – "And they saw projections in the style of Pol Pot in the murderous fanaticism of the Andean terrorists" (Gorriti & Portocarrero, 1983b, p. 17)[45]. The story and photos both rely on the peasants as experts who can best illustrate and explain the massacre. When asked whether he noticed a lack of interest by limeños in violent events happening in rural areas like Ayacucho, Gorriti had this to say:

> They [the limeños] were affected as I told you, those that listened over the radio to the way that the people described the case and cried despite all the social and cultural and prejudices between a limeño from the middle class and those Andean peasants from Lucanamarca. Many people told me that they just broke down and

[45] "Y quienes veían proyecciones polpotianas en el fantaismo homicida de los terroristas andinos…"

> began to cry… But on the other hand, of course the difference in terms of commitment, importance, urgency that people felt for things that were happening in a far away place like Ayacucho, or afterwards other provinces, and what happened to them [in Miraflores], was of course a very, was a very, a very noticeable thing (G. Gorriti, personal interview, April 6, 2014).

Series on SL Presence at El Frontón prison

In Chapter 3, I mentioned Gorriti's 1982 trip to the island prison of San Juan Bautista prison, also known as El Frontón, outside of Callao. I will discuss the three-part series he published following the trip in further detail in this section. But first, I start at the end of the story of El Frontón in order to provide greater context for Gorriti's series. Part of investigative journalism's power comes from its ability to identify trends and problems before they enter the national arena. Gorriti's 1982 series would prove to be an omen for events that unraveled four years later.

By 1986, SL prisoners achieved virtual control over certain parts of the island prison, particularly the area known as Pabellón Azul. The Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación's (CVR) final report said that the prisoners' control extended "over the entrance of authorities, people, and materials and other resources into the interior of the compound, prisoners were even allowed to alter the physical structure of the construction and adapted it for their means"[46] (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación [CVR], 2003f, p. 741). On the morning of June 18, 1986, SL inmates at El Frontón, Lurigancho, and Santa Bárbara del Callao began rioting as part of a coordinated attack. Prisoners clashed violently with Republican Guardsmen and prison guards, with some of the latter being taken hostage (CVR, 2003f, p. 743). The prisoners were motivated out of a desire for better living situations, protest against a planned transfer to maximum security prison Canto

[46] "sobre el ingreso de autoridades, personas y materiales u otros recursos al interior de estos recintos, lo que permitió incluso que los internos alteraran la estructura física de la construcción y la adaptaran a los fines de su organización."

Grande, and recognition as political prisoners (CVR, 2003f, p. 743). On June 18 and 19, the armed forces led assaults on all three prisons and more than 200 people died (Burt, 2007, p. 63). Estimates of prisoners killed at El Frontón range between 111 and 130. The CVR (2003f) concluded that inmates accused or convicted of terrorism were "extrajudicially executed by agents of the State"[47] (p. 737). The CVR (2003e) stated in its general conclusions that the killings "marked a turning point in the efforts of the PAP government to use civilian power to impose a new regime of respect for human rights on the security forces. The [Commission] has found that beginning with those events, the armed forces acted with greater autonomy in their counter-subversive actions, without either the Executive or the Legislative branch providing them with a legal framework to do so"[48] (point 69).

Looking back at Gorriti's series on El Frontón, he described how Pabellón Azul was tightly controlled by SL, how SL prisoners were separated from other criminals, how the Senderistas insisted on their status as political prisoners, and how they complained of deteriorating living conditions. In the first installation of the series, Gorriti (1982c) describes his arrival, by boat, to the eerie island prison that had held some of the country's most well-known political prisoners over the decades, including President Belaúnde. He witnesses the 250 or so inmates and their "impeccable training," as they chant Presidente Gonzalo's dogma and sing SL songs (Gorriti, 1982c, p. 22). He conducts a question and answer session with various SL members in their quarters decorated with red flags and paintings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao on the wall. "We – they continue – we have the

[47] "ejecutados extrajudicialmente por agentes del Estado"

[48] "marcó una inflexión en el esfuerzo del gobierno del PAP por imponer desde el poder civil un nuevo esquema de respeto de los derechos humanos por las fuerzas del orden. La CVR ha constatado que, a partir de los sucesos mencionados, las fuerzas armadas actuaron con mayor autonomía en su actividad contrasubversiva, sin que el Poder Ejecutivo ni el Poder Legislativo las proveyeran de un marco legal para ello."

essential, that is the correct ideology: the Marxism – Leninism – Maoism – guiding thought of Comrade Gonzalo. In this moment, we are at the forefront, we are the lighthouse of the world revolution"[49] (Gorriti, 1982c, p. 64). He sees how food must be prepared over wood and coal fires over bricks because the kitchen does not work. Perhaps more importantly, he notes that there are 315 detainees, many of whom have been held "for around two years without being brought before a judge"[50] (Gorriti, 1982c, p. 65).

In the second article of the series, Gorriti went to Playa 1 where individual cells hold two or three prisoners that have asked to be separated from Pabellón Azul. He was there to interview a "prisoner of conscience," but prisoners chanting SL slogans were too loud to continue (Gorriti, 1982d). Prisoners had left their cells and gone to the terrace to demonstrate. They repeated the same slogans as the prisoners in Pabellón Azul and "their succession, the number of repetitions and rhythm are the same" (Gorriti, 1982d, p. 34). Gorriti's writing showed the apparent spread of SL's ideology throughout the prison, regardless of whether the prisoners were receptive to the group's message. Yet, in the third article for the series, Gorriti focused on the prisoners held in El Chaparral. These prisoners "are willing to work in coordination with the prison authorities"[51] (Gorriti, 1982e, p. 30). Some prisoners claimed to have been falsely accused and to have been without the opportunity for legal defense (Gorriti, 1982e, p. 32). Prisoners keep a distance from SL. Some of them were "apparent Senderistas that appeared to have had problems with their organization"[52] (Gorriti, 1982e, p. 32). Gorriti concluded the series with a conversation between himself and a Republican Guard. The guard said that SL had guards 24 hours a

[49] "Nosotros – continúan – tenemos lo fundamental, que es la ideología correcta: el marxismo – leninismo – maoísmo– pensamiento-guía del camarada Gonzalo. En este momento, estamos a la vanguardia, somos faro de la revolución mundial".
[50] "alrededor de dos años sin haber comparecido ante el juez."
[51] "son dispuestos a trabajar en coordinación con las autoridades de la prisión."
[52] "aparentes Senderistas que parecieran haber tenido problemas con su organización."

day who observed authorities' movements. The leadership within the prison met at night and wore balaclavas. "Almost all [prisoners] were people without training. Here, they trained,"[53] he told Gorriti (Gorriti, 1982e, p. 32). The final installment of Gorriti's series exposes the divisions within the prison, while still emphasizing SL's control over the prisoner population and prison authorities' lack of psychological and physical control over most of the buildings. SL and non-SL prisoners complained of subpar conditions and a lack of legal recourse. Looking at Gorriti's article in retrospect, the subsequent riots and subsequent killings at El Frontón seemed inescapable.

Sí and the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres

I now examine how investigative reporters, with the assistance of anonymous military sources, revealed the existence of a clandestine death squad working under orders from the highest ranks of the government and military. In 1983, the government deployed the military to fight SL. The military committed numerous gross human rights violations in its attempts to squash the subversive threat. Fujimori's administration also used clandestine death squads to supplement the actions of the military and to keep operations under wraps. In the massacres of La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, journalists began to see the hallmarks of a clandestine tactical unit at work. By reporting on events like the massacres at La Cantuta and Barrios Altos, investigative reporters at *Sí, La República* and *Caretas* served the function of exposing wrongdoing that the state tried very hard to keep secret. Through their stories on La Cantuta case, Ricardo Uceda, Edmundo Cruz, and José Arrieta-Matos of *Sí* physically uncovered evidence that revealed the existence of a death squad that eventually landed Fujimori in jail. However, as mentioned above, reporting

[53] "Casi todos eran gente sin formación. Aquí los forman."

from the investigative team at *La República,* as well as Cecilia Valenzuela at *Caretas* simultaneously worked to uncover the presence of the death squad.

On November 3, 1991, Grupo Colina, a death squad fashioned by Fujimori and Montesinos, killed fifteen partygoers they suspected of having ties to SL at a Barrios Altos neighborhood house party. Then on July 18, 1992, just three months after Fujimori's autogolpe and two days after SL killed more than 40 people with a bomb on Tarata Street in the middle-class limeño neighborhood of Miraflores, Grupo Colina abducted and killed nine students and a professor from La Cantuta University. *La República* published a brief about the disappearance the following day, initially the only mention of the incident in the mainstream press. The bodies of the students and professor would not be found until a year later when reporters from *Sí* received an anonymous tip with a map pointing them to hidden graves outside of Lima.

Before elaborating on *Sí*'s coverage of the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta killings, it is necessary to provide some background about Grupo Colina. This was a secret, military death squad whose existence was unknown to the public at the time of the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta massacres. Investigative coverage of the killings in Barrios Altos raised questions about the possible existence of some kind of paramilitary group. The November 11 cover of *Caretas* read "Bullets That Speak"[54] and the subtitle: "Paramilitaries seek to destabilize Civilian Power."[55] In the main article, the authors recount the event starting with the setting up of the party and ending with the massacre by uniformed men with military-style haircuts who arrived in a van and Jeep with sirens on the roofs ("La Matanza de Barrios Altos," 1991, p. 30-44). The journalists initially said that the manner of the killings pointed to SL and described how they intended to destabilize society and to send a

[54] "Balas Que Hablan"
[55] "Paramilitares Buscan Desestabilizar al Poder Civil"

message to international actors by carrying out the attack the day after the departure of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, part of the Organization of American States, left Peru ("La Matanza de Barrios Altos," 1991, p. 44). However, they concluded the article by saying that because of the absence of diversionary tactics and the weapons involved, a paramilitary group or a collection of disgruntled military members carried out the attack ("La Matanza de Barrios Altos," 1991).

Sí published an 8-page report on the massacre in its November 11 issue and made clear that evidence pointed to a state-sanctioned group being behind the attack. Under the title on the first page of the story, the magazine published "…you don't need to be police to say that the claw of state terrorism may be behind this killing"[56] (Silvestre, 1991, p. 70). The report included photos of the scene and the bodies, as well as graphics recreating the event. One particular photo shows the street where the murders happened and includes notes indicating the buildings where the massacre took place and the building for the Intelligence of the National Police. There is a line indicating the two are only 30 meters apart. A caption writes that sergeant 2º PG Luis Prado Reyes was on rounds that night and did not see anything strange, but did see two vans that carried the "assassins" (Silvestre, 1991, p. 73). Presumably to characterize the group that carried out the attack, the article included an info box that elaborates on the types of weapons used and the likelihood that silencers were employed. The authors cited a witness "that worked in the Navy" as saying the weapons used were machine guns (Silvestre, 1991, p. 74). They cited Reyes' testimony saying he did not hear any shooting. A witness and neighbors were also cited as saying

[56] "…no se necesita ser policía para afirmar que la garra del terrorismo de Estado puede estar detrás de esta matanza."

they heard "popping noises"[57]. The author wrote "Obviously the assassins took precautions and placed silencers on their weapons"[58] (Silvestre, 1991, p. 74).

Throughout the rest of the article, Silvestre reconstructed the events of the evening, using very specific details. At times, he cited general "witnesses," but at other times, he named specific people and survivors of the attacks as having given certain information. In some instances, he cited statements of witnesses given to police. It is unclear how he obtained the statements. An info box printed portions of an interview with survivor, Natividad Condorcahuana, alongside a photo of her in the hospital and what appears to be a reporter taking notes (Silvestre, 1991, p. 73). By using eyewitness accounts and providing names, the author gains credibility among the readership.

Less than a year later, men in plainclothes forcefully took a group of students and a professor from Universidad Nacional de Educación Enrique Guzmán y Valle, known as La Cantuta. The Peruvian army had occupied the university in May 1991 as part of efforts against the Shining Path (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 1993, p. 2). Investigative outlets reported on the disappearances with the use of eyewitness accounts. Family members presented writs of *habeas corpus* to the courts seeking investigation and protection of the disappeared (HRW, 1993, p. 6). Then, on April 1, 1993, Congressman Henry Pease presented what appeared to be an internal army intelligence document he had received from a group called *León Dormido*[59] (HRW, 1993, p. 7). The document said that the students and professor from La Cantuta had been executed and buried with approval from high-level military officials (HRW, 1993, p. 7). Among the officials who ordered the kidnapping, according to the document, were President of the Joint Command of the Armed

[57] "ruidos secos"
[58] "Obviamente los asesinos tomaron sus precauciones y colocaron a sus armas silenciadores."
[59] "Sleeping Lion"

Forces General Hermoza Ríos and Montesinos. In light of Pease's revelation, Congress set up a commission to investigate the case, but that commission faced several obstacles from the army, Fujimori administration, and governing majority in Congress (HRW, 1993, p. 8, 11). Then, on May 6, General Rodolfo Robles Espinoza, who was third in command of the armed forces, released a letter accusing the army, Montesinos, and Major Santiago Enrique Martín Rivas of operating a death squad that committed the Barrios Altos massacre and La Cantuta disappearances (HRW, 1993, p. 9). On July 12, 1993, *Sí* published an investigative story that uncovered the existence of hidden graves. It was later confirmed that these were the scholars from La Cantuta.

The cover of the July 12 edition of *Sí* showed a photo of four men, including José Arrieta, Ricardo Uceda, and Edmundo Cruz, looking over a dirt pit. The caption explained they are looking at the remains of a bone. A cut out of a map was in the corner of the page. It illustrated the presence of four tombs or pits. There was no mention of La Cantuta on the entire page. The opening spread of the story, "In Search of the Truth,"[60] showed another picture of the same event with a time stamp of the place: Cieneguilla, and the date: Thursday the 8th, 7:01 A.M. (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 18-19). On the following two pages, *Sí* published reproduced a map they received from an anonymous source[61]. The map included a message that explained it was a plan presented to the public in the case of the disappearance of the students and professor from La Cantuta ("El Mapa," 1993, p. 20-21). The message said that the authors recently decided to make it known that they were afraid for their lives, but that "God protects us and good men"[62] ("El Mapa," 1993, p. 22).

[60] "En Busca de la Verdad"

[61] It was later revealed that army intelligence agent Mariella Barreto had leaked the map. She was killed, presumably in retaliation. She had been part of the La Cantuta operation (Burt, 2007, p. 256).

[62] "Dios nos protege y los buenos hombres"

Included is a note: "They are many footprints from military style shoes in the first tomb"[63] ("El Mapa," 1993, p. 22). On page 23 of the story, there is a picture of a pelvic bone with the note that the magazine received a package of human remains with the map (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 23).

Sí's written report began on page 22. Cruz and Arrieta wrote in a narrative style, using short sentences to take the reader with them on a trip to discover the graves. The piece started out like a journal log "Thursday, July 8th, 5:45 in the morning. Height 14 km on the highway Lima – Cieneguilla, in the perimeter of the capital" (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 22). The reporters were presented as "investigators" with a stated mission, "to confirm the veracity of important information" (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 22). They established the remote nature of the place, explaining that only garbage trucks passed by, and that at a certain point, they had to proceed on foot. The authors wrote that they were then joined by an archaeology student, a pathologist, a cameraman, reporters, and Uceda. Seven paragraphs in, the journalists explained how they located the spot (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 24). They had received the anonymous letter and map that had led them to this place five days earlier. This trip was to determine whether the information was true. They wrote that Uceda made it clear to partially open the pit, and to stop exploration at the first indication of remains so that the judicial authority could be notified. They wrote that is what happened after discovering the first bone.

[63] "Hay bastantes pisadas de zapatos de militares en la primera tumba"



Illustration 1: *Sí*'s La Cantuta Investigation

(Left) Cover of July 12, 1993 issue of *Sí*. (Right) Map of the graves reproduced in the July 12, 1993 issue of *Sí* ("El Mapa," 1993, p. 20-21).

Illustration 2: Message accompanying map given to *Sí*

- *This plan is for the public in the disappearance of the students and the teacher from La Cantuta.*
- *Here are the students buried by the military.*
- *A month ago they were buried, burned, in cardboard boxes*
- *This is the plan which will uncover these hidden graves.*
- *For further evidence and proof here we send the hip bone and bits of charred human flesh, which had been burned first in the barracks*
- *Recently we decided to make it known that we were afraid for our lives, but God protects us and good men. And for the health of the country and democracy, which as good Peruvians we have the right to review and clarify that and to punish those murderers who are not far from discovery. Therefore we provide this plan and the exact place so that the public knows.*

NOTE: There are many footprints from military shoes in the first tomb.[64]

---

64 Este plano es para la opinión pública de la desaparición de los alumnos y el profesor de La Cantuta.

- Aquí están los alumnos enterrados por los militares.
- Hace un mes están enterrados, quemados, en cajas de cartón.
- Este es el plano por el cual van a descubrir estas tumbas clandestinas.
- Para mayor evidencia y prueba aquí le enviamos el hueso de la cadera y pedazos de carne humana calcinados, que han sido quemados primero en el cuartel. ñ
- Recién nos hemos decidido a ponerlo en conocimiento porque teníamos miedo por nuestras vidas, pero Dios nos protege y los buenos hombres. Y para la salud del país y la democracia, que como buenos peruanos tenemos derecho en opinar y que se esclarezca y se sancione a esos asesinos que no están

Then, they painted the scene of that afternoon when more than a hundred national and foreign reporters arrived at the pits, along with prosecutors (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 28). They wrote how the press pushed for further investigation when officials hesitated. The reporters explained that they were not declaring the remains to be from the La Cantuta massacre - that would be a job for the justice system (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993). They retraced witness and official testimony concerning the La Cantuta investigation to that point. They said the magazine had worked to obtain civilian and military testimony that might help to reconstruct what happened to the disappeared. They had received "anonymous testimony from intelligence officials from the Army and operational intelligence agents" (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 30). Their investigation led to the eventual delivery of the package containing the map, letter, and human remains. Concerning the discovery of the graves, they were clear: "the violation of human rights is evident,"[65] but the identification of the victims was a task for the judiciary (Cruz & Arrieta, 1993, p. 38).

In a separate section labeled "Consensus to Investigate," *Sí* explained how they had to push officials to investigate the graves. They described how "it had not occurred to anyone to bring bags to collect the remains and they had to improvise by stapling sheets together"[66] ("Consenso para investigar," 1993, p. 23). They explained that there was opposition in the government to giving the Uceda and reporters from *Sí* requested protections. They detailed closely how possession of the remains would be handled by the government and scientists. ("Consenso para investigar," 1993). An editorial accompanied the articles in order to explain the timeline for the discovery of the graves and the release

---

muy lejos en descubrirlos. Aportamos entones con este plano y el lugar exacto para que la opinión pública sepa.

NOTA: Hay bastantes pisadas de zapatos de militares en la primera tumba.

[65] "La violación de derechos humanos es evidente"

[66] "A nadie se le ocurrió llevar bolsas para recoger los restos y tuvieron que improvisarlas engrapando hojas bond"

of information to authorities ("El derecho de cavar, 1993, p. 25). At times they had partial and unverified information and so debated the merits of waiting to reveal it in order to assure proper investigation and justice for the victims. Their reporting shows precision and efforts to inform the public of their exact investigation. Considering the delicate nature of the issue, I hypothesize this was done as an attempt at transparency, but also to protect themselves from legal action. This was not the last time that *Sí* received an anonymous tip about La Cantuta. A second burial site, which was where the professor and students were murdered, was found in Huachipa in November (Burt, 2007, p. 182) after *Sí* received information from an anonymous member of Grupo Colina (Cruz, 2007).

Sí's investigations of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta highlight the great dangers for journalists who uncover secrets with the potential of implicating high officials who act outside of the law. As discussed previously, the government and military attempted, via legal sanctions, to force Uceda to reveal his sources from the La Cantuta stories. After the discovery of the graves, officials, such as the attorney general, stalled investigation and protection of the grave sites. Attorney General Blanca Nélida Colán argued that the journalists of *Sí* had committed crimes against the administration of justice ("Justicia al revés," 1993, p. 18-20). Through its own pages, *Sí* defended its actions and was critical of those of the government. Journalists knew that because of their investigations and stories, they entered dangerous territory. In the trailer for the documentary *La Cantuta en la Boca del Diablo*[67], Cruz says "When we had to go back to Cieneguilla, I was afraid, no? What protections did we have? None. And obviously we had played with the lion's beard"[68] (as cited by Proyectocantuta, 2010).

---

[67] For more detailed information on Cruz's reporting process, see Gonzales (2010).

[68] "Cuando tuvimos que volver a Cieneguilla, me dío miedo no? que protección teníamos nosotros? Ninguna. Y obviamente le habíamos tocaba la barba de león."

Sí also suffered editorial and economic setbacks as a result of the investigation. In a 2008 interview with María Mendoza Michilot, which she published in her book *100 Años de periodismo en el Perú,* Cruz recounts how the government worked to shut down *Sí* after the report on La Cantuta. "…the government weighed the power that a newspaper managed independently and truthfully could have...for that reason, they devised a plan to control the magazine *Sí"*[69] (as cited in Mendoza, 2013, p. 324). Cruz said they did this through withholding advertising to the magazine.

> We always had financial difficulties, but after La Cantuta was a time when we did not receive pay for up to three months. We found no explanation because advertising remained more or less. So we thought that this was an economic pressure against management. The director had the transparency to tell me: "I hired Uceda to make an independent magazine and has made an antigovernment magazine. I disagree with that. "So, this is why there isn't pay? "Yes – he told me -. Because the president's brother has come here and blocked advertising from me"[70] (as cited in Mendoza, 2013, p. 324).

In 1994, a military court found a group of military officers guilty of the La Cantuta murders, but they were granted amnesty the following year without serving time or being relieved of duty (Burt, 2007, p. 182). However, Peruvians eventually saw justice in the 2000s for the La Cantuta murders. Cruz's testimony about La Cantuta was presented to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which found the state to be culpable for the massacre in 2006 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2006). Then, in April 2009, the Supreme Court of Peru convicted Fujimori of human rights abuses and of ordering the massacres. In its general conclusions, the CVR (2003e) called the efforts of investigative

---

[69] "…el gobierno sopesó el poder que podía tener un periódico manejado con independencia y con la verdad…por eso idearon un plan para controlar a la revista *Sí."*

[70] "…Nosotros siempre tuvimos dificultades económicas, pero después de La Cantuta hubo un momento en que no recibimos pago hasta por tres meses. No encontramos explicación porque la publicidad más o menos se mantenía. Entonces, llegamos a pensar que esta era una presión económica contra la dirección. El director tuvo la transparencia de decirme: "Contraté a Uceda para que hiciera una revista independiente y ha hecho una revista antigobiernista. Yo no estoy de acuerdo con eso". ¿Entonces por eso no hay pagos? "Sí – me dijo - . Porque aquí ha venido el hermano del presidente y me ha bloqueado la publicidad."

journalists in the case of reporting on La Cantuta "indispensable to uncovering who was responsible for horrific crimes"[71] (point 149).

[71] " indispensable para encontrar a los responsables de los crímenes"

CHAPTER 5: Conclusions

Over the last 35 years, Peru has experienced a transition to democracy, a brutal civil war, renewed authoritarianism, and ultimately a return to relative peace and stronger democracy.
(Root, 2012, p.1)

From 1980 to 2000, political violence and government corruption threatened Peru's return to democracy. Investigative journalists at a select group of publications were able to overcome threats of violence and authoritarian restrictions on their practice and to uncover abuses of power that threatened the peoples' democratic rights. Jason Felch (2004) noted that independent journalists working during the Fujimori administration "were able to uncover many of the regime's crimes, and are today credited with playing an important role in its fall" (p. 45). We can see the impact of these journalists in the ways they informed civil society of the threats from both SL and Fujimori, how they pressured law enforcement and the judiciary to investigate, how they created organizations that would work to check power in the future, and how they documented history so as to inform the collective memory of Peruvians for the future. Additionally, while initially relegated to alternative publications, investigative journalism became mainstream by the end of the millennium (Waisbord, 2000, p. 52). The efforts made by pioneering investigative journalists like Gorriti, Páez, Cruz, and Uceda showed media elite, politicians, and citizens the value of in-depth, investigative reporting. As a result, more publications invested the time and money necessary to support these projects.

Investigative journalists from this period have gone on to found independent news sites and organizations dedicated to in-depth investigative reporting projects that uncover abuses of power. The Institute of Press and Society[72] was formed in Lima in 1993 "as a

[72] In 2010, the International Programme for Development of Communication of UNESCO provided the Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad in Peru with $33,000.00 to train journalists in poor regions of Peru and

reaction to the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori, who cut democratic freedoms"[73] ("El IPYS"). Its mission was and is to defend journalists and to promote freedom of expression, access to public information and independent journalism in Latin America. With Ricardo Uceda as its director, the organization has invested its resources into investigative reports. The organization also organizes the Conferencia Latinoamericana de Periodismo de Investigación (COLPIN) and promotes investigative journalism throughout the region. Gorriti, who has served as president of IPYS, started the nonprofit investigative journalism site IDL-Reporteros in 2009. Journalists of the organization publish internationally recognized investigative pieces about economic and governmental abuse, as well as narco-trafficking.

The lasting impact of these journalists is felt beyond the organizations they founded to ensure the legacy and freedom of investigative reporting for the future. References to newspaper and magazine articles fill the footnotes of the hundreds of pages that make up the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación's (CVR) final report, a testament to journalism's role as historian. Additionally, the work of journalists about the internal war also lives on in *Yuyanapaq. Para Recordar*, a permanent exhibit housed in the National Museum in Lima that tells the story of the internal war. The CVR created the exhibit partly with the help of photo archives from print publications like *Caretas, El Comercio, Ojo, La República,* and *Correo.* Photos of victims, subversives and security forces are featured alongside text describing the main events and issues of the conflict. In the log book at the front of the exhibit, visitors from around Peru and the world fill the pages. The exhibit is a testament to the role of media as record keepers, historians, and documentarians.

Ecuador in methods of investigative journalism. The project title is "Strengthening Democracy by Promoting Investigative Journalism and Transparent Access to Public Information."

[73] "como una reacción al gobierno autoritario de Alberto Fujimori, que recortó las libertades democráticas"

Fourteen years later, the various stories of the people affected by the internal conflict are still being told.



Illustration 3: Lucanamarca

This photo by *Caretas* photojournalist Oscar Medrano is featured in the exhibit *Yuyanapaq. Para Recordar*. This photograph shows the scene in Lucanamarca described earlier in the essay by reporter Gustavo Gorriti. The village is holding an open court to describe the massacre that took place days earlier to General EP Roberto Clemente Noel Moral. (Photo of O. Medran's Lucanamarca Photo)[74]

There is also a less optimistic side to the impact made by investigative journalism. Journalists have been forced to confront the legacies of corruption and denunciation in post-Fujimori and post-SL society. When U.S. journalist Jason Felch went to Lima in 2004 he heard how the press was struggling with the legacy of the previous decade as a time

[74] The text accompanying the photo at the exhibit Yuyanapaq. Para Recordar at the National Museum reads: "Open court in the main square of Lucanamarca days after the massacre perpetrated by the Shining Path members. On April 3, 1983 nearly 100 from the Shining Path entered this village in the province of Huancasoncos, Ayacucho, killing 69 people, including 18 children. The image shows the presence of General EP Roberto Clemente Noel Moral, head of the Political – Military Command of Ayacucho. – Lucanamarca, Huancasoncos, Ayacucho, April 1983. Photo: Oscar Medrano, Magazine *Caretas*."

when investigative journalism routinely uncovered abuse. In 2004, the ways corruption was being uncovered and the people uncovering it had changed. There were now many voices and publications critical of the government and a new kind of journalism based on *denuncialogía*, or the reliance on denunciations to produce reports. Critics of denuncialogía say it relies less on hard and thorough work and more heavily on quickly produced reports fueled by recordings and tips. In this new political and media environment, Felch (2004) heard journalists asking three questions that are central to the questions being explored in this thesis. First, should different standards apply to journalists working under a dictatorship and a democracy? For instance, are "hidden cameras, illicit recordings, stolen documents, and paid sources" still acceptable? (Felch, 2004, p. 43). Second, were reporters less critical of Alejandro Toledo's democratic government than they were of Fujimori's dictatorship? And third, would the proliferation of critical voices become a threat to democracy? (Felch, 2004, p. 43). In other words, has denuncialogía become an end in itself rather than a means to an end?

Felch (2004) talked to some of the great investigative journalists from the 1990s and found them divided on the topic of denuncialogía and the prevalence of voices critical of the government. *Caretas* director Zileri told him "[denuncialogía] trivializes investigative journalism. It generates a frenzy of aggression… It creates in the population a sense that the country is in chaos, that we can't be governed by a democracy" (as cited in Felch, 2004, p. 44). Cecilia Valenzuela, once a reporter under Zileri, worked as an anchor on a TV news program that used some aspects of denuncialogía to critique the president and political class. She saw little difference between denuncialogía and the methods used by investigative journalists in the 1990s (as cited in Felch, 2004). She also saw little difference between the new democratic government and the authoritarian government of Fujimori. Corruption was just easier to expose under Toledo because the administration

was “inept” (as cited in Felch, 2004, p. 47). She told Felch, “Now nobody believes in anything: in politicians, in journalists, in priests. That doubt is healthy. For now, we have the right to feel our pain, to live our sorrow, to expiate our faults” (as cited in Felch, 2004, p. 47).

The case of Peruvian journalism under the internal war shows the price of an independent press free to question authority and abuses. But, the question posed by denuncialogía is whether that freedom can go too far and eventually undermine a democratic system. Should investigative journalists abandon the practice of relentlessly questioning authority now that Peru is governed by democracy? Obviously, the answer is no. If they did, the country would risk falling back under corrupt leadership which feels there are no checks on its power. If denuncialogía poses risks to democracy, it would be that reports stemming from quick denunciations that are reliant solely on insider tips lack thorough checking and confirmation.

Felch (2004) said Zileri “conceded that serious investigative reporting might in fact be harder under a democracy than under a dictatorship” (p. 44). According to Zileri, “‘It’s like an orchestra of voices now,” whereas before “it was much easier to hear the noise’” (as cited in Felch, 2004, p. 44). I take this to me that the multitude of critical voices meant it was more difficult to separate quality and fact from hastily prepared hearsay. Which reports are based on tips, but also thorough reporting and confirmation via documents and a network of sources, and which simply came out of quick tips? In his discussion of *denuncismo,* “facile denunciations that lack sufficient evidence and are the product of information passed by one or two sources,” Waisbord (2000) points to the fact that journalists are largely not transparent about the newsgathering and checking processes (p. 103). How do readers know if a story is based on quick tips or thorough fact checking? Waisbord (2000) says “The problem is not just about journalistic transparency but also

about newsgathering routines that legitimize and perpetuate insidious practices that reinforce inequalities in media access" (p. 110). If the public does not understand that behind the denunciations, a game of power politics is being played by official sources with vested interests in the revelations, what is the cost to democracy? This plays into Zileri's statement that it had grown difficult to "hear the noise."

I heard from investigative journalists that practiced during the internal war that they could not have done their jobs without anonymous sources. They could not have revealed abuses of power that threatened citizens' rights without them. I have seen attributions to "trusted high-level military sources" in articles. I have also seen some attempts to explain how access to interviews was gained. But for the most part, Waisbord is correct. Journalists do not make a habit of revealing in articles how they obtained information. How they received a tip through a telephone call or a document left on their doorstep. This could be for multiple reasons ranging from lack of space in the final article to, most important, protection of sources. Whether these omissions work against democracy is a topic for another paper. With this thesis, I strove to reveal the newsgathering practices behind investigative reports produced in the midst of authoritarian pressures. In that, I hope I have been successful.

Academics have considered the fourth estate role of investigative journalism and its relation to democracy. More work needs to be done to examine the techniques that investigative journalists are using in transitional or compromised democracies where reporters do not benefit from sufficient press freedoms. Future research might consider the effects of denuncialogía on transitional democracies or how to practice investigative reporting in stateless countries, as proposed by Waisbord (2007).

From 1980 to 2000, SL and Fujimori's government saw the potential threat of investigative journalism and acted to restrict freedoms of outlets like *Caretas*. But

journalists like Gustavo Gorriti combatted their efforts through the cultivation of sources and dogged pursuit of first-hand interaction with the state and guerrilla actors carrying out the violence. Investigation reporters often do not have the time constraints placed on other reporters. More time to do research allows more time to navigate through restrictions and interview sources for a more complete story. This results in deeper reporting of the events. The journalists discussed in this thesis show that where there is great political violence and conflict, reporters must carefully cultivate sources and make the effort to not only meet the actors, but also carry out considerable research about them and their context. Additionally, editors and directors of press outlets must recognize the potential threat of restrictions on press freedom from the government and actively work to resist them.

Appendices

APPENDIX 1. GENERAL ELECTIONS – PRESIDENT

YEAR	*PARTY*	*CANDIDATE*	*%*
1980			
	AP	Fernando Belaúnde Terry	44.9
	APRA	Armanda Villanueva del Campo	27.2
	PPC	Luis Bedoya Reyes	9.6
1985			
	APRA	Alan García Pérez	53.1
	IU	Alfonso Barrantes Lingán	24.7
	CODE	Luis Bedoya Reyes	11.9
1990			
R1	FREDEMO	Mario Vargas Llosa	32.6
	Cambio 90	Alberto Fujimori Fujimori	29.2
	APRA	Luis Alva Castro	22.5
R2	Cambio 90	Alberto Fujimori Fujimori	62.4
	FREDEMO	Mario Vargas Llosa	37.6
1995			
	NM/C90	Alberto Fujimori	64.3
	UPP	Javier Pérez de Cuéllar	21.5
	APRA	Mercedes Cabanillas	4.1

AP: Acción Popular
APRA: Partido Aprista Peruano
Cambio 90: Nueva Mayoría Cambio 90
CODE: Convergencia Democrática
FREDEMO: Frente Democrático
IU: Izquierda Unida
PPC: Partido Popular Cristiano

Source: Tuesta Soldevilla, F. (2001). Perú Político en Cifras (Tercera ed., Rep.). Fundación Friedrich Ebert. Retrieved March 11, 2015, from http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/elecciones.html

APPENDIX 2. DEAD AND DISAPPEARED INDIVIDUALS (BY PROVINCE)

MAPA 1. PERÚ 1980 – 2000. CANTIDAD DE MUERTOS Y DESAPARECIDOS REPORTADOS A LA CVR SEGÚN PROVINCIA



Source: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003, August 28). Compendio Estadístico (Anexo 3). In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013, from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

APPENDIX 3. POLLING DATA

Average yearly approval ratings for Fujimori by social sector, 1990-2000

A: upper-class
B: middle-class
C: working-class
D: poor class

YEAR	A	B	C	D	TOTAL
1990*	60	58	57	59	55
1991	43	44	44	41	43
1992	74	70	68	66	70
1993	65	66	64	64	65
1994	70	62	63	67	66
1995	78	72	72	75	74
1996	66	57	58	63	61
1997	42	37	38	43	40
1998	39	33	39	43	39
1999	39	37	45	51	44
2000**	38	42	42	50	43

*Total averaged from 5 months
**Total averaged from 11 months

Source: Grupo Apoyo

Democracy and Government

Question: All things considered, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Peru? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

	July 1991	Nov 1992
Very satisfied	5%	10%

Somewhat satisfied	31	45
Somewhat dissatisfied	33	25
Very dissatisfied	25	15
Don't know	5	5

Source: United States Information Agency. (1993). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: In your opinion, which type of government is best for Peru – a democratically-elected government, a military government, or a revolutionary government?

	July 1991	Nov. 1992
Democratically-elected	59%	77%
Military	28	10
Revolutionary	5	4
Don't know	8	9

Source: United States Information Agency. (1993). *Government, General* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: Preferred form of government by satisfaction with democracy in Peru (1992)

	Country Total	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Democratic	77%	86%	68%
Military	10	7	16
Revolutionary	4	2	6
Dk/nr	9	5	10

Source: United States Information Agency. (1992). *Government, General* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: Percent who are satisfied with democracy in Peru (1996)

Satisfied	28%
Not very satisfied	53
Not at all satisfied	12

Source: United States Information Agency. (1996). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: Generally, would you say that you have confidence in these institutions? (1996)

Catholic church	81%
Media	69
Naval forces	55
National Police	44
Congress	41
Judiciary	39

Source: Apoyo Opinion y Mercado S.A. (1996). *Confidence in Government* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: At the end of the sixth year of the government of Alberto Fujimori, do you think these things are better, the same, or worse? (1996)

	Better	Same	Worse
Freedom of expression	28%	43%	20%
Respect of human rights	32	40	16
Control of corruption	33	30	34
Control of terrorism	72	20	6
Control of inflation	41	36	18

Source: Apoyo Opinion y Mercado S.A. (1996). *Fujimori, Alberto* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Peru? (1999)

Don't reply	1%
Very satisfied	4
Fairly satisfied	13
Not very satisfied	49
Not at all satisfied	30
Don't know	2

Source: Latinobarometro (1999). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Question: In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Peru? (2001)

No reply	2%
Very satisfied	3
Fairly satisfied	13
Not very satisfied	48
Not at all satisfied	26
Don't know	7

Source: Latinobarometro (2001). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Terrorism

Question: Would you say the government of Peru is doing a good job or is doing a poor job in its effort to stop insurgency and terrorism? Is that very or somewhat good?

	Nov 1992
Very good job	45%
Somewhat good job	45
Somewhat poor job	2
Very poor job	2
Dk/nr	6

Source: United States Information Agency (1993). *Insurgents* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

References

(1992, April 8). *El Comercio.*

Apoyo Opinion y Mercado S.A. (1996a). *Confidence in Government* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Apoyo Opinion y Mercado S.A. (1996b). *Fujimori, Alberto* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Blanco Woolcott, G., & Rojas Samanez, A. (Eds.). (1990). *Sendero de violencia* (1st ed.). Lima: Colegio de Periodistas del Peru y el Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia.

Briceno, F. (2001, January 8). Peru's Fujimori convicted of corruption in fifth trial. *The Associated Press*. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from www.ap.org

Burt, J. (2007). *Political violence and the authoritarian state in Peru: Silencing civil society*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carrión, J. (2006). Conclusion: The Rise and Fall of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru. In *The Fujimori legacy* (pp. 242-267). University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University.

Chiappe, C. (1983, February 7). [Letter to the editor]. *Caretas*, (734), 1.

Collett, M. (1988). The voice on the Shining Path. *Columbia Journalism Review*, *27*(4), 14-18. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from https://www.ebscohost.com/.

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación. (n.d.). Yuyanapaq. Para Recordar. [Photographic exhibit]. Museo de la Nación, Lima, Perú.

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003a, August 28). Compendio Estadístico (Anexo 3). In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013, from Comisión

de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003b, August 28). Conclusiones. In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013, from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003c, August 28). Cronología 1978-2000 (Anexo 1). In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013, from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003d, August 28). El Caso Uchuraccay 5(2.4). In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013, from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003e, August 28). General Conclusions. In *Final Report* (Rep.) Retrieved October 3, 2013, from La Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003f, August 28). Las ejecuciones extrajudiciales en el penal de El Frontón y Lurigancho (1986) 7(2.67). In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013, from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, (2003g, August 28). Los Medios de Comunicación 3(3.4). In *Informe Final* (Rep.). Retrieved October 3, 2013,

from Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación website: http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php

Conaghan, C. M. (2005). *Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the public sphere*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Consenso para investigar. (1993, July 12). *Sí*, (332), 22, 23, 38.

Cruz Vílchez, E., & Arrieta, J. (1993, July 12). En busca de la verdad. *Sí*, (332),18-19, 22-31,38.

Cruz, E. (2007, June 10). La Cantuta: Lo que nunca se dijo. *La República*. Retrieved March 11, 2015, from http://LaRepublica.pe

Cruz, E. (2014, July 15). Edmundo Cruz Vílchez [Personal interview].

El derecho de cavar [Editorial]. (1993, July 12). *Sí*, (331), 25.

El IPYS. (n.d.). Retrieved February 20, 2015, from www.ipys.org

El Mapa. (1993, July 12). *Sí*, (332), 20-22.

El Mensaje. (1993, July 12). *Sí*, (332), 22.

Felch, J. (2004). Have Peru's press heroes gone too far? *Columbia Journalism Review, 43*(2), 43-47. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from www.ebscohost.com.

Fujimori convicted of corruption. (2009, July 20). *BBC News*. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8160150.stm

Fujimori pleads guilty to bribery. (2009, September 28). *BBC News*. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8279528.stm

Global Terrorism Database. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2014. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Gonzales, A. (Director). (2010). La cantuta en la boca del diablo [Motion picture]. Peru: TV Cultura.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1981, October 26). El operativo. *Caretas*, (670), 23-25.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1982a, April 26). Habla Sendero. *Caretas*, (695), 31-33.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1982b, July 17). La policía frente al terrorismo. *Caretas*, (707), 20-24.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1982c, September 20). Sendero en el Frontón. *Caretas*, (715), 20-23, 64, 65.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1982d, September 27). Sendero en el Frontón II: Gonzalismo y fanatismo. *Caretas*, (716), 32-35.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1982e, October 4). Sendero en el Frontón III: 'El Chaparral'. *Caretas*, (717), 30-32.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1983a, February 21). El sobrino Abimael. *Caretas*, (736), 10-13.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1983b, June 13). Rondando Iquicha. *Caretas*, (752), 26-27.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1983c, November 21). Abimael y las elecciones. *Caretas*, (775), 16-17.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1993). Living dangerously: Issues of Peruvian press freedom. *Journal of International Affairs*, *47*(1), 223-241. Retrieved October 21, 2014, from www.ebscohost.com.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1999). *The Shining Path: A history of the millenarian war in Peru*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (2011). Intimidation, exile and the exhilaration of an investigative story being published. *Nieman Reports*, *65*(1), 61-63. Retrieved October 21, 2014, from www.ebscohost.com.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (2014, April 6). Gustavo Gorriti [Personal interview].

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (2014, July 23). Gustavo Gorriti [Personal interview].

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G., & Portocarrero, B. (1983a, January 10). Explosivo arrojo. *Caretas*, (730), 22-25.

Gorriti Ellenbogen, G., & Portocarrero, B. (1983b, April 11). La matanza de Lucanamarca. *Caretas*, (743), 10-17.

Goytizolo Castro, M. (2009). *El Perseguidor: La Peligrosa Vida Del Periodista Ángel Páez*. Peru: Melissa Goytizolo Castro.

Hayes, M. (1993, April 8). Peru's power in the shadows – Fujimori's top adviser has a dark past but wields immense control. *Associated Press*. Retrieved January 17, 2015, from www.ap.org

Human Rights Watch. (1993, September 27). News from Americas Watch (Rep.). Retrieved May 7, 2015, from Human Rights Watch website: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/PERU939.PDF

Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. (2001, January 19). Case 12.085 Ana Elena Townsend Diez-Canseco Et. Al. (Wiretapping) Peru (Rep. No. 1/01). Retrieved January 15, 2015, from the University of Minnesota website: https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Peru-REPORT%20No.%201%20Townsend%20tapes.pdf

Inter-American Court of Human Rights. (2006, November 29). Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case of La Cantuta v. Perú (Rep.). Retrieved January 15, 2015, from The Inter-American Court of Human Rights website: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_162_ing.pdf

Justicia al revés. (1993, July 19). *Sí,* (333), 18-24.

Kirk, R. (1991). Peru: Commando-style journalism. *Columbia Journalism Review, 30*(1), 37-38. Retrieved January 24, 2015, from www.ebscohost.com.

Krauss, C. (1998, January 6). Peru reporters say officials direct harassment effort. *The New York Times*. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from www.nytimes.com

Kruijt, D. (2001). Low intensity democracies: Latin America in the post-dictatorial era. *Bulletin of Latin American Research, 20*(4), 409-430. Retrieved October 20, 2014, from www.ebscohost.com.

La matanza de Barrios Altos. (1991, November 11). *Caretas*, 30-44.

Latinobarometro (1999). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Latinobarometro (2001). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Levitsky, S. (1999). Fujimori and post-party politics in Peru. *Journal of Democracy, 10*(3), 78-92. Retrieved October 23, 2014, from www.ebscohost.com.

Mauceri, P. (1996). *State under siege: Development and policy making in Peru*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Mauceri, P. (1997). Return of the caudillo: Autocratic democracy in Peru. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(5), 899-911. doi:10.1080/01436599714650

McClintock, C. (2006). Electoral authoritarian versus partially democratic regimes: The case of the Fujimori government and the 2000 elections. In *The Fujimori legacy* (pp. 242-267). University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University.

Mendez Campos, M. (2014, July 17). Marco Mendez Campos [Personal interview].

Mendoza Michilot, M. (2013). *100 años de periodismo en el Perú: 1949-2000* (1st ed., Vol. 2). Lima: Fondo Editorial (Universidad de Lima).

Mendoza Michilot, M. (2014, July 18). María Mendoza Michilot [Personal interview].

Mensch, J. R. (2009, August 7). Violence and blindness: The case of Uchuraccay. Retrieved November 12, 2013, from www.openDemocracy.net

Mioli, T. (2008). *State control of the media and its effects on democracy: The 1990 – 2000 Peruvian administration of Alberto Fujimori* (Unpublished master's thesis). The University of Texas at Austin.

Mioli, T. (2014, September 11). Peruvian general is under investigation for death of journalist during internal war in 1988 [Web log post]. Retrieved March 11, 2015, from https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-15726-peruvian-general-under-investigation-death-journalist-during-internal-war-1988

Paredes Castro, J. (2014, July 18). Juan Paredes Castro [Personal interview].

Páez, Á. (2014, July 25). Ángel Páez [Personal interview].

Photo of O. Medrano's Lucanamarca Photo [Personal photograph taken in Museo de la Nación, Lima]. (2014 June).

Potestá, O. (2014, June 30). Orazio Potestá [Personal interview].

Proyectocantuta. (2010, February 10). *Teaser del documental "La Cantuta en la boca del diablo"* [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4-bQcA3WGg&list=PL64372EA5213B379A&index=1.

Romero, S. (2007, December 12). Peru's ex-president gets 6 years for illicit search. *The New York Times*. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from www.nytimes.com

Romero, S. (2009, April 7). Peru's ex-president convicted of rights abuses. *The New York Times*. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from www.nytimes.com

Root, R. K. (2012). *Transitional justice in Peru*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rospigliosi, F. (2000). *El arte del engaño: Las relaciones entre los militares y la prensa*. Lima: Tarea Asociación Gráfica Educativa.

Schmidt, C. (2000). *Press, Power, and Politics: Peru 2000* (Rep.). Retrieved March 11, 2015, from Freedom Forum website: http://www.gci275.com/archive/perurereport2000.pdf

Schudson, M. (2008). *Why democracies need an unlovable press*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T. B., & Schramm, W. L. (1963). *Four theories of the press: The authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Silvestre, M. (1991, November 11). Horror y misterio. *Sí*, 70-77.

Simon, J. (1998). Hot on the money trail. *Columbia Journalism Review, 36*(5), 50-55. Retrieved January 25, 2015, from www.ebscohost.com.

Tanaka, M. (2005). Peru 1980-2000: Chronicle of a death foretold? Determinism, political decisions, and open outcomes. In *The third wave of democratization in Latin America: Advances and setbacks since 1978* (pp. 261-288). New York, NY: Cambridge UP.

Trazos polémicos. (1993, July 19). *Sí*, (333), 26.

Tuesta Soldevilla, F. (2001). Perú Político en Cifras (Tercera ed., Rep.). Fundación Friedrich Ebert. Retrieved March 11, 2015, from http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/elecciones.html

Uceda, R. (2014, July 29). Ricardo Uceda [Personal interview].

United States Information Agency. (1992). *Government, General* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

United States Information Agency. (1993a). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

United States Information Agency. (1993b). *Government, General* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

United States Information Agency (1993c). *Insurgents* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

United States Information Agency. (1996). *Democracy* [Data set]. Polling the Nations [Distributor]. Retrieved from http://www.orspub.com/

Waisbord, S. (2000). *Watchdog journalism in South America: News, accountability, and democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waisbord, S. (2002). Challenges of investigative journalism. *University of Miami Law Journal, 56*(2), 377-395. Retrieved October 21, 2014, from http://home.heinonline.org

Waisbord, S. (2007) Democratic journalism and 'statelessness.' *Political Communication,* 24, 115-129. doi: 10.1080/10584600701312837

Waisbord, S. (2013). Democracy, journalism, and Latin American populism. *Journalism, 14*(4), 504-521. Retrieved January 14, 2015, from http://jou.sagepub.com

Wood, D. (2000). The Peruvian press under recent authoritarian regimes, with special reference to the autogolpe of President Fujimori. *Bulletin of Latin American Research, 19*, 17-32. Retrieved October 20, 2014, from www.ebscohost.com.